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EXPANDING STARE DECISIS: 
THE ROLE OF PRECEDENT IN 
THE UNFOLDING DIALECTIC OF 
BRADY V. MARYLAND 
Colin Starger* 
          Does stare decisis constrain the expansion of constitutional 
doctrine? Does existing precedent preclude the Supreme Court from 
expanding a criminal defendant’s right to exculpatory evidence? While 
commentators frequently clash on when stare decisis should prevent the 
Court from overruling its own precedents, the question of when fidelity 
to precedent should inhibit doctrinal expansion is surprisingly 
undertheorized. This Article begins to fill this gap through an in-depth 
case study of stare decisis and the expansion of criminal due process 
doctrine. 
          The Article analyzes the longstanding constitutional dialectic 
between procedural and substantive schools of criminal due process. 
Focus is on Brady v. Maryland—the Court’s landmark 1963 decision 
that requires prosecutors to disclose favorable evidence to criminal 
defendants. Last Term, Justice Scalia argued in his Connick v. 
Thompson concurrence that Brady’s scope does not extend to 
prosecutorial disclosure of untested evidence that could prove 
innocence. Though coherent, Justice Scalia’s argument depends on a 
particularly formal approach to stare decisis and a procedural view of 
due process. His argument against expanding Brady can be contested 
by what I term a “justificatory” approach to stare decisis and a 
competing substantive view of due process. This recent conflict between 
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formal and justificatory stare decisis approaches and competing due 
process schools reflects a deeper metadoctrinal pattern. 
          Based on a close reading of over a century of caselaw, this 
Article demonstrates how successful justificatory stare decisis 
arguments have facilitated expansion of criminal due process while 
formal stare decisis arguments have constrained doctrinal growth. 
Building on prior work, I illustrate the Brady dialectic and its 
relationship to stare decisis through graphical “opinion maps” that 
chart rival lines of majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions. 
Mapping this key due process territory offers insight on the deeper 
conflict between substance and procedure in due process jurisprudence 
as well as a generalizable method for studying the impact of stare 
decisis on constitutional adjudication. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Despite his fervent assertions of innocence, John Thompson 
faced execution for murder.1 One month before his appointed date to 
die, defense investigators uncovered a laboratory report withheld by 
prosecutors in Orleans Parish before Thompson’s 1985 trial.2 Based 
on the report, Thompson conducted forensic blood testing that first 
exonerated him of an armed robbery and then led to his acquittal of 
the capital murder charges.3 Prosecutorial suppression of the 
laboratory report had nearly cost Thompson his life, so upon his 
release, he sued the Orleans Parish District Attorney for violating his 
constitutional rights.4 A federal jury awarded him $14 million in 
damages.5 After the Fifth Circuit upheld the verdict, the Supreme 
Court—by a 5–4 margin—took it away.6 The apparent callousness of 
the majority’s decision in Connick v. Thompson7 grabbed headlines 
and provoked sharp dissent.8 
Behind these compelling facts lies a rather technical legal issue. 
Thompson had filed suit under the federal civil rights statute, 42 
U.S.C. § 1983. He argued that the District Attorney bore 
responsibility for the suppressed laboratory report because he had 
failed to properly train Orleans Parish prosecutors in the law of 
Brady v. Maryland—the Supreme Court’s landmark 1963 decision 
that requires prosecutors to disclose favorable evidence before trial.9 
In an opinion by Justice Thomas, the majority held that the single 
 
 1. Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1356 (2011). 
 2. Id. The laboratory report revealed that prosecutors had ordered testing on pants 
splattered with the blood of the perpetrator of an armed robbery blamed on Thompson. The real 
perpetrator had type B blood. Prosecutors never disclosed the report nor existence of the pants to 
Thompson. Neither did they order forensic testing of Thompson’s blood. 
 3. Id. at 1356–57. Thompson had type O blood, proving he was not the armed robber. With 
the robbery conviction vacated, Thompson was finally able to testify in his own defense to the 
murder charges and demonstrate to his jury’s satisfaction that another man had committed the 
crime. 
 4. Id. at 1357. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at 1358, 1366 (rev’g 578 F.3d 293 (5th Cir. 2009)). 
 7.  131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011). 
 8. See Dahlia Lithwick, Cruel but Not Unusual, SLATE (Apr. 1, 2011, 7:43 PM), http:// 
www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2011/04/cruel_but_not_unusual.html 
(calling Justice Thomas’s opinion “one of the meanest Supreme Court decisions ever”). 
 9. See Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 1355 (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 (1963)). 
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Brady violation that occurred in Thompson’s case—suppression of 
the lab report—did not provide an adequate basis for failure-to-train 
liability under § 1983.10 In dissent, Justice Ginsburg vociferously 
disputed the single-Brady-violation characterization of the trial 
record and argued that the jury had concluded that “conceded, long-
concealed prosecutorial transgressions were neither isolated nor 
atypical.”11 
While commentators have naturally focused on Thompson’s 
effect upon civil rights law, this focus overlooks a potentially more 
explosive consequence on criminal due process doctrine. In his 
separate concurrence, Justice Scalia mounted an attack that purported 
to transcend Thompson’s failure-to-train posture and address 
prosecutors’ primary constitutional obligations under Brady v. 
Maryland. Here Justice Scalia zeroed in on the dissent’s assertion—
uncontested by the parties in the case—that Brady requires the State 
to disclose “physical evidence that, which if tested, could establish 
the innocence of the person who is charged.”12 Justice Scalia railed 
against this asserted Brady obligation “as a sub silentio expansion of 
the substantive law of Brady.”13 Justice Scalia then proclaimed, “If 
any of our cases establishes such an obligation, I have never read it, 
and the dissent does not cite it,” and he concluded that any “right to 
untested evidence” lies at the “very frontier of our Brady 
jurisprudence.”14 
The implications of Justice Scalia’s claim are deadly serious. 
Taken literally, his logic dictates that John Thompson never had a 
right to discover the evidence that saved him from the gallows.15 
This should trigger serious due process concerns. Though not as 
 
 10. Id. at 1356–66. 
 11. Id. at 1370 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 12. Id. at 1368–69 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing id. at 1380, n.13 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 34, Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011) (No. 09-571))). 
 13. Id. at 1369 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Though Justice Scalia did not argue against Thompson’s exoneration, he clearly did 
argue that Brady doctrine imposes no obligation upon prosecutors to disclose evidence—like the 
suppressed lab report in Thompson’s case—“whose inculpatory or exculpatory character is 
unknown.” Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 1369 (Scalia, J., concurring). While Justice Scalia apparently 
conceded that Assistant District Attorney Gerry Deegan committed a Brady violation, see id., the 
fact remains that Deegan only ever suppressed potentially exculpatory evidence. Justice Scalia’s 
doctrinal analysis, thus, logically holds that Deegan did not violate Brady. 
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robust as commentators had hoped,16 Brady remains the flagship 
constitutional doctrine for putting evidence of innocence into the 
hands of criminal defendants.17 Excessively limiting Brady threatens 
to make the Constitution irrelevant to the ongoing “innocence 
revolution”18—a revolution heralded by the advent of forensic DNA 
testing of evidence.19 The Court has already held that due process 
does not guarantee convicted defendants access to postconviction 
DNA testing.20 If Justice Scalia is right about Brady, due process 
may not even afford criminal defendants the right to access 
potentially exculpatory DNA evidence before trial. 
Yet Justice Scalia may not be right. Indeed, I suggest that his 
objection to recognizing a right to untested evidence rests upon an 
entirely contestable interpretation of due process doctrine backed by 
an entirely contestable theory of stare decisis. Doctrinally, Justice 
Scalia’s assessment of Brady’s reach elevates a narrow procedural 
interpretation of due process above a viable, competing, and broader 
substantive due process alternative. Less obviously, Justice Scalia 
 
 16. Professor Sundby captured the widely held attitude of many commentators when he 
memorably called Brady a “fallen superhero.” See Scott E. Sundby, Fallen Superheroes and 
Constitutional Mirages: The Tale of Brady v. Maryland, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 643 (2002); see 
also Daniel S. Medwed, Brady’s Bunch of Flaws, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1533, 1535–36 
(2010) (arguing that Brady doctrine has failed to live up to the ideals of the original decision). 
 17. No other constitutional doctrine has forced the Court to deal with innocence issues as 
squarely as Brady has. While the Court has steadfastly declined to decide whether the 
Constitution protects freestanding claims of actual innocence, see House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 
554–55 (2006) (declining to resolve freestanding innocence question left open by Herrera v. 
Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993)), the Court’s Brady cases have featured free-ranging discussions 
about innocence issues, including the ethical obligations of prosecutors to seek to protect the 
innocent. See, e.g., Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 470 n.15 (2009). Commentators have recognized 
the continuing importance of Brady to innocence. See generally Ellen Yaroshefsky, Foreword—
New Perspectives on Brady and Other Disclosure Obligations: What Really Works?, 31 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1943, 1943–59 (2010) (introducing a symposium on Brady largely concerned 
with ways to protect innocence). 
 18. See Mark A. Godsey & Thomas Pulley, The Innocence Revolution and “Our Evolving 
Standards of Decency” in Death Penalty Jurisprudence, 29 U. DAYTON L. REV. 265 (2004); 
Lawrence C. Marshall, The Innocence Revolution and the Death Penalty, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 
573 (2004); Daniel S. Medwed, Emotionally Charged: The Prosecutorial Charging Decision and 
the Innocence Revolution, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2187 (2010). 
 19. Professor Brandon Garrett is the leading chronicler and analyst of DNA exonerations. 
See generally BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT (2011); Brandon L. Garrett, 
Claiming Innocence, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1629 (2008); Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, 
Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1 (2009); 
Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55 (2008); Brandon L. Garrett, The 
Substance of False Confessions, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1051 (2010). 
 20. See Dist. Attorney’s Office v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308 (2009). 
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backs his argument by assuming a particularly formalistic theory of 
stare decisis vis-à-vis the evolution of doctrine. He does this even 
though a less formal—what I shall call a justificatory—approach to 
stare decisis is also viable. The right to untested evidence 
illegitimately expands Brady doctrine only under Justice Scalia’s 
procedural and formal account. Under an alternative substantive and 
justificatory account, the right already exists comfortably within 
Brady’s borders. In short, the coherence of Justice Scalia’s claim, 
that the right to untested evidence lies “at the very frontier of our 
Brady jurisprudence,” depends entirely on how you map the due 
process territory. 
This Article thus undertakes a novel survey of Brady’s contested 
territory. Following the cartographic metaphor, due process doctrine 
is realized through a series of graphical “opinion maps” of Brady’s 
due process origins and progeny.21 The concept and method 
animating these maps are both dialectic.22 Conceptually, the maps in 
this Article show how due process doctrine evolves as an unfolding 
argument between competing schools of jurisprudential thought. 
Methodologically, the maps are created by plotting citations between 
competing majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions in Brady 
cases.23 The result is a picture of precedent that visualizes the rival 
“lines of opinions” in the opposing procedural and substantive due 
process schools. Over the long history of this due process dialectic, 
majority control of the Court has shifted back and forth between 
these schools. By tracing these ancestral paths, I connect Justice 
 
 21. Here I build on previous work mapping different regions of constitutional doctrine. See 
Colin Starger, Exile on Main Street: Competing Traditions and Due Process Dissent, 95 MARQ. 
L. REV. 1253, 1260 (2012) (mapping “economic liberty” and “incorporation” strands of 
“substantive due process doctrine”) [hereinafter Starger, Exile on Main Street]; Colin Starger, 
Response: Meaning and Metaphor in Trawling for Herring, 111 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 109 
(2011) (mapping Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule doctrine). 
 22. In its long and storied history, “dialectics” has acquired many different senses. See 
generally NICHOLAS RESCHER, DIALECTICS: A CLASSICAL APPROACH TO INQUIRY 119–74 
(2007) (tracing the multiple and evolving meanings of “dialectic” from early Greek to modern 
times). In this Article, I employ the concept of dialectic to describe the ontological mechanism by 
which Supreme Court doctrine evolves. My dialectical method charts the competing lines of 
majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions and derives from the formal disputational structure 
of Supreme Court argument. 
 23. While direct citation provides the primary means for connecting opinions, I sometimes 
place opinions in rival lines based on more nuanced hermeneutic connections. These connections 
are justified by explicit argument. See infra Part III.A (elaborating on the mapping method). 
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Scalia’s argument in Thompson to the teachings of the now-dominant 
procedural school. 
By charting the competing schools’ shifting fortunes, this 
Article seeks to explain how key substantive or procedural 
arguments prevailed in the due process dialectic. This rhetorical 
inquiry requires attention to a surprisingly undertheorized problem 
surrounding the operation of stare decisis in constitutional 
adjudication.24 The problem is directly raised by Justice Scalia’s 
accusation from Thompson that recognizing a right to untested 
evidence would work a “sub silentio expansion” of Brady doctrine. 
Despite echoing the more familiar charge of sub silentio overruling, 
Justice Scalia’s formulation inverts the usual direction of critique.25 
Rather than decrying covert attacks on constitutional precedent, 
Justice Scalia objects to surreptitiously giving Brady’s precedent too 
much life. This raises the metadoctrinal question of exactly how to 
differentiate legitimate from illegitimate expansions of constitutional 
rules. While the Court and legal commentators alike have long 
clashed over when stare decisis should prevent the Court from 
overruling controversial precedents, the question of how stare decisis 
should constrain doctrinal expansion has received no sustained 
attention.26 This Article begins to fill this gap through its in-depth 
 
 24. “Stare decisis” literally means “to stand by things decided” and refers to the doctrine of 
following precedent. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1537 (9th ed. 2009). In this Article, I am 
concerned only with questions surrounding the Court’s following of its own precedent, often 
called “horizontal stare decisis” in the literature. See Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 
U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 2024–25 (1993). By referring to the principle of stare decisis, I therefore do 
not invoke questions of “vertical precedent”—how precedent binds inferior courts in the judicial 
hierarchy. Cf. Michael Serota, Stare Decisis and the Brady Doctrine, 5 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 
415, 415 n.1 (2011) (analyzing Brady and considerations of “vertical stare decisis” in pretrial 
motion-to-compel controversies). 
 25. For recent analyses of the Court’s sub silentio overrulings, see Barry Friedman, The 
Wages of Stealth Overruling (with Particular Attention to Miranda v. Arizona), 99 GEO. L.J. 1 
(2010); Christopher J. Peters, Under-the-Table Overruling, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 1067 (2008). 
 26. The rich academic literature on constitutional stare decisis focuses almost exclusively on 
theoretical considerations informing the Court’s choice between overruling versus affirming its 
own precedent. For a representative sampling of this literature, see MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE 
POWER OF PRECEDENT 9–46 (2008); Richard Fallon, Stare Decisis and the Constitution, 76 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 570, 570–73 (2001); Friedman, supra note 25, at 8–29; Henry P. Monaghan, 
Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723, 748–55 (1988); Michael 
S. Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress Remove the Precedential Effect of 
Roe and Casey?, 109 YALE L.J. 1535, 1537–43 (2000); Peters, supra note 25, at 1067–73; 
Lawrence B. Solum, The Supreme Court in Bondage: Constitutional Stare Decisis, Legal 
Formalism, and the Future of Unenumerated Rights, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 155, 186–201 (2006). 
The Court’s own debates over stare decisis have also invariably occurred in the context of 
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case study of stare decisis and the expansion of criminal due process 
doctrine. 
This Article’s Brady-mapping project and stare decisis case 
study are inextricably intertwined. The two strands fuse because the 
doctrinal dialectic implicated by Brady has turned on debates over 
whether to expand or contract—as opposed to overrule—prior 
precedent. At the time of the ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in 1868, protections for criminal defendants were 
profoundly weaker than they are today. The maps herein first tell the 
story of how a series of due process extensions eventually 
culminated in the Court’s 1963 creation in Brady of a freestanding 
criminal discovery right.27 These doctrinal innovations were often 
hotly contested, but formal stare decisis objections to expanding 
precedent were unable to command majority support. However, the 
due process territory changed between Brady and 1985’s United 
States v. Bagley.28 In Bagley, formal stare decisis arguments 
prevailed over justificatory counterarguments and effectively 
contracted Brady’s scope. Since 1985, Bagley’s materiality standard 
has become entrenched, and the Court’s Brady debates have largely 
turned into disputes over how to apply facts in particular cases.29 
Nonetheless, key questions about Brady’s scope remain.30 
 
decisions to overrule (or not) prior precedent. For the most recent salvo in this debate, compare 
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 130 S. Ct. 876, 919–22 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., 
concurring) (supporting the Court’s overruling of Austin), with id. at 938–42 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (stating that overturning precedent requires more than “a significant justification, 
beyond the preferences of five Justices”). Professor Farber has also noted a gap in the literature 
regarding what it means to follow (as opposed to overrule) precedent. See Daniel A. Farber, The 
Rule of Law and the Law of Precedents, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1173, 1198–99 (2006). 
 27. See infra Part III. 
 28. 473 U.S. 667 (1985). See infra Part IV.A (analyzing Brady-to-Bagley era). 
 29. See infra Part IV.B (analyzing era from Bagley until this Term’s case in Smith v. Cain, 
132 S. Ct. 627 (2012)). 
 30. In addition to the right-to-untested-evidence question raised by Thompson, the Court also 
has left open whether prosecutors have an obligation to disclose evidence of innocence to 
defendants during the pretrial plea negotiation stage. See United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 
622–23, 631, 633 (2002) (upholding a “fast-track plea” bargain that contained waiver of Brady 
right to disclosure of impeachment material but where government agreed to disclose information 
“establishing factual innocence”). The courts are also divided on Brady’s pretrial scope and 
application. Compare United States v. Sudikoff, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1206 (C.D. Cal. 1999) 
(granting discovery under Brady), with United States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132, 146 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(holding that Brady did not compel “immediate disclosure of all exculpatory and impeachment 
material”). In a recent article, Michael Serota argues that cases following Sudikoff fall afoul of 
vertical stare decisis. See Serota, supra note 24, at 429. However, authority is divided precisely 
because the Court has not spoken clearly. Cf. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 700 
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Based on a close reading of over a century of caselaw, this 
Article thus demonstrates how successful justificatory stare decisis 
arguments have facilitated expansion of criminal due process while 
formal stare decisis arguments have constrained doctrinal growth. 
Beyond its Brady insight, this Article offers new perspective on the 
deeper conflicts between substance and procedure in due process 
jurisprudence as well as a generalizable method for studying the 
dialectics of stare decisis in constitutional adjudication. 
Though its primary thrust is descriptive, this Article also has a 
normative take-away. I ultimately critique the currently dominant 
formal and procedural view that Brady is a mere means to achieve a 
fair trial. Drawing on an older tradition, I advocate instead a 
substantive conception of Brady as a constitutional bulwark for 
protecting the ends of justice and argue that the fundamental concern 
with innocence that drove the creation of Brady’s right should guide 
the doctrine in this era of DNA exonerations. 
This Article’s argument proceeds as follows: 
Part II develops the stare decisis frame of the inquiry. After 
discussing conventional understandings of stare decisis as a 
constraint on overruling, I propose new categories to describe 
precedential constraint on doctrinal expansion. Here I explain the 
difference between formal and justificatory views of stare decisis. 
Applying these terms to Thompson, I show how Justice Scalia’s 
attack on the due process legitimacy of a right to untested evidence 
rests upon a particularly formal view of Brady precedent. 
Parts III and IV constitute the heart of the Brady-mapping 
project. This survey details the dialectic between the procedural and 
substantive due process schools. Part III’s map covers the years from 
1868 until Brady was decided in 1963. Part IV has two maps. The 
first charts the debate from Brady until 1985’s seminal Bagley 
decision; the second surveys the dialectic from Bagley until the 
present. 
The broad stare decisis narrative of Part III begins after the 
passage of the Fourteenth Amendment. Early Court majorities 
generally rejected due process challenges to state criminal 
 
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (explaining that Bagley’s interpretation of Brady’s materiality 
requirement “imposes on prosecutors the burden to identify and disclose evidence pursuant to a 
pretrial standard that virtually defies definition”). 
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convictions so long as state procedures appeared to provide 
procedural fairness. However, a dissenting school advocated using 
due process to conduct substantive inquiries into whether 
miscarriages of justice had occurred. After considering a series of 
racially and politically charged controversies, the substantive school 
wrestled majority control of the Court and expanded the due process 
territory. This expansion culminated in Justice William Douglas’s 
1963 opinion for the Court in Brady and was made possible by a 
justificatory approach to prior precedent. 
Part IV begins with the debates from Brady to Bagley. As I 
show, Justice Harry Blackmun’s opinion in Bagley secured a major 
victory for the school advocating a procedural understanding of 
Brady based on a formal view of stare decisis. Justice Thurgood 
Marshall’s Bagley dissent remains the classic articulation of a 
substantive alternative based on a justificatory attitude toward 
precedent. In the post-Bagley years, stare decisis concerns took a 
backseat in the mainline dialectic as battles over Brady’s legal 
meaning largely gave way to disputes over the application of facts. 
However, unsettled legal questions over Brady’s scope remain. 
Part V considers these unsettled legal questions and makes my 
normative case for the best path forward. Although Brady itself is 
practically immune from overruling and deserves recognition as a 
“super-precedent,”31 formal interpretations of Brady unnecessarily 
limit its reach in the DNA era. Taking inspiration from Justice 
Thurgood Marshall, I call for a return to the “majestic conception” of 
Brady doctrine animated by a substantive due process protection-of-
innocence principle.32 
 
 31. See GERHARDT, supra note 26, at 177 (defining super-precedents as “practically immune 
to overturning”). Since John Roberts’s 2005 confirmation proceedings, there has been a renewed 
interest in “super-precedents.” See id. at 177–78; Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 
HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1750–52 (2007); Michael J. Gerhardt, Super Precedent, 90 MINN. L. REV. 
1204, 1205–06 (2006); Lee Epstein & Tonja Jacobi, Super Medians, 61 STAN L. REV. 37, 40 n.13 
(2008). However, no scholar to date has identified Brady as a super-precedent; Michael Sinclair, 
Precedent, Super-Precedent, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 363, 365 (2007). 
 32. Justice Marshall elucidated Brady’s substantive due process principles in a series of 
brilliant but underappreciated dissents. See infra Part V. I borrow the “majestic conception” 
phrase from Justices Ginsburg and Stevens. See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 151 
(2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 18 (1995) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting)) (calling for return to the majestic conception of the Fourth Amendment). 
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In my conclusion, I briefly reflect on the implications of this 
case study for future doctrinal and metadoctrinal scholarship on 
expanding stare decisis. 
II.  STARE DECISIS, BRADY, AND 
THE RIGHT TO UNTESTED EVIDENCE 
Philip Bobbitt has famously identified “doctrinal argument” as 
an archetypical modality of constitutional argument.33 A “modality 
of argument” is essentially a coherent discursive way of addressing 
constitutional disputes.34 Argument modalities proceed under their 
own self-contained logics and come with their own set of 
adjudicative principles.35 In the case of doctrinal argument, the 
relevant modal logic concerns how to “apply[] the rules generated by 
precedent.”36 A preeminent adjudicative principle in doctrinal 
argument is stare decisis.37 
Consider how rules generated by precedent—the substantive 
holdings in cases—differ from the stare decisis adjudicative principle 
about precedent. Rules generated by precedent define the specific 
boundaries of a given doctrine; they are first-order doctrinal rules. 
The principle of stare decisis applies across doctrinal boundaries; it is 
a second-order metadoctrinal principle. Critically, constitutional 
disputes can involve arguments over doctrinal rules and 
metadoctrinal principles. Opponents can contest both what relevant 
 
 33. See Philip C. Bobbitt, Is Law Politics?, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1233, 1255–61 (1989) 
[hereinafter Bobbitt, Is Law Politics]. Bobbitt identifies five other argumentative modalities—
historical, textual, structural, ethical, and prudential. Id. at 1234; see also PHILIP C. BOBBITT, 
CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 39–58 (1982) (describing doctrinal 
argument). 
 34. See Bobbitt, Is Law Politics, supra note 33, at 1255 (describing argumentative modalities 
as “how assertions are determined to be correct”). 
 35. The idea of a modality’s “self-contained logic” might be more fruitfully conceived as its 
essential logos. See Colin Starger, The DNA of an Argument: A Case Study in Legal Logos, 99 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1045, 1054–55 (2009) (describing logos as “a mode of proof”). 
Because argument modalities have separate and distinct logoi, conflicts between modalities are 
essentially “incommensurable.” See id. at 1080–81 (applying Thomas Kuhn’s theory of 
incommensurability to conflicting argument logoi); see also Bobbitt, Is Law Politics, supra note 
33, at 1244 (criticizing Mark Tushnet for failing to come to terms with “the modal perspective” 
that makes a single theory of the Constitution impossible). 
 36. Bobbitt, Is Law Politics, supra note 33, at 1234. 
 37. Stare decisis is a relatively recent doctrine. For an older but still excellent historical 
account of its emergence, see E.M. Wise, The Doctrine of Stare Decisis, 21 WAYNE L. REV. 1043 
(1974). 
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precedent is and how it should be applied on a given record, and/or 
they can argue over whether stare decisis requires that a particular 
precedent be followed, overruled, expanded, or contracted. 
By definition, Supreme Court doctrinal arguments involve first-
order disputes over doctrinal rules generated by prior Court opinions. 
Though the Court decides some doctrinal arguments unanimously, 
other times majority, concurrence, and dissent split.38 When splits 
occur, competing Court opinions may invoke different prior 
majority, concurring, or dissenting opinions to support their 
perspective on doctrinal rules. Those prior opinions, in turn, may 
have invoked the authority of even earlier competing opinions. For 
certain highly contentious constitutional concepts—such as “due 
process” or “equal protection” or the power to “regulate 
commerce”—this argument over doctrine may persist for 
generations. When this occurs, competing lines of opinions 
effectively cohere into distinctive intellectual traditions. Rival 
traditions may be regarded as competing doctrinal schools.39 
When doctrinal schools clash, first-order fights over doctrinal 
rules often involve a second-order dialectic over stare decisis. The 
metadoctrinal debate may be explicit or implicit, but the application 
of stare decisis is itself often contested. Scholarly debate on stare 
decisis has traditionally focused on whether and when it is 
permissible for the Court to overrule its own prior interpretations of 
the Constitution.40 A related yet distinct controversy arises when all 
members of the Court accept a constitutional precedent’s validity but 
disagree over whether the accepted precedent’s scope should be 
expanded. This far less mooted stare decisis question is directly 
 
 38. In the October 2010 Term, 48 percent of the Court’s merits opinions were unanimous. 
See Stat Pack-October Term 2010, SCOTUSBLOG (June 28, 2011), http://sblog.s3.amazonaws 
.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/SB_votesplit_OT10_final.pdf. By comparison, 20 percent of 
merits opinions had 5–4 splits. Id. Over the previous five terms, the average was 41 percent 
unanimous and 22 percent 5–4. Id. 
 39. The connection between doctrine and schools of thought is inherent. As Professor 
Goodrich reminds us, the English word “doctrine” literally derives from the Latin doctrina, 
meaning “teaching” and corresponding to the word disciplina, meaning “learning.” PETER 
GOODRICH, READING THE LAW 136 (1986) (“Doctrine consists of the truths handed down by 
educators—by priests, judges, politicians, scholars and so on—all of whom are experts in the 
classics, custodians of ancient truths which are preserved for and presented to their contemporary 
audiences.”). 
 40. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.  
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raised by Justice Scalia’s accusation of sub silentio expansion in 
Thompson. 
In this Part, I develop a vocabulary for describing the rhetorical 
positions that may be taken in debates over stare decisis and then 
apply it to the Brady debate in Thompson. Part II.A first discusses the 
difference between strict and lax conceptions of stare decisis in the 
overruling context and then proposes a distinction between formal 
and justificatory approaches to expanding precedential scope. Part 
II.B applies this frame to Thompson and shows how Justice Scalia’s 
charge that any right to untested evidence exists at the frontier of the 
Court’s Brady jurisprudence exemplifies a particularly formal view 
of stare decisis. 
A.  A Taxonomy of Stare Decisis 
American jurists have long recognized that the Supreme Court 
has the power to overrule its own prior decisions.41 Yet just how 
bound the Court should be by its own prior interpretations of the 
Constitution remains controversial. A strict view of stare decisis 
generally advocates for adherence to precedent and against 
overruling. By contrast, a lax view accepts overruling more easily 
and deemphasizes strict adherence to precedent. These competing 
positions represent poles on a spectrum concerning the constraining 
force of precedent. In other words, for any given constitutional 
doctrine, one may adopt a stricter or more lax view of the force of 
stare decisis’s command. These competing positions have also been 
described as strong and weak views of precedent.42 
The canonical articulation of the lax view of constitutional stare 
decisis originates in Justice Louis Brandeis’s dissent in Coronado 
Oil43: 
 
 41. See Solum, supra note 26, at 156 n.3. 
 42. See GERHARDT, supra note 26, at 47–68. Professor Solum has described essentially the 
same split as between formalist/neoformalist views (taking strict or strong positions on stare 
decisis) and Realist/instrumentalist views (adopting lax or weak positions). See Solum, supra note 
26, at 186–88. 
 43. See Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405–13 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). As Professor Lee has observed, Justice Brandeis’s Coronado Oil dissent is likely the 
Court’s single most cited opinion concerning stare decisis. See Emery G. Lee III, Overruling 
Rhetoric: The Court’s New Approach to Stare Decisis in Constitutional Cases, 33 U. TOL. L. 
REV. 581, 592 & n.71 (2001). In a forthcoming work, I trace the singular influence of Justice 
Brandeis’s dissent on stare decisis doctrine. See Colin Starger, The Dialectic of Stare Decisis 
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Stare decisis is not, like the rule of res judicata, a 
universal inexorable command . . . . Stare decisis is usually 
the wise policy, because in most matters it is more 
important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that 
it be settled right. This is commonly true even where the 
error is a matter of serious concern, provided correction can 
be had by legislation. But in cases involving the Federal 
Constitution, where correction through legislative action is 
practically impossible, this court has often overruled its 
earlier decisions.44 
Under Justice Brandeis’s view, the Court should abandon its 
constitutional precedent when doing so comports with “the lessons of 
experience and the force of better reasoning.”45 As an empirical 
matter, Justice Brandeis was undoubtedly correct that the Court has 
many times overruled its constitutional precedents.46 Indeed, the 
Court has discarded its own precedents more than 200 times in its 
history.47 
While the empirical reality of overruling is undeniable, opinions 
about the practice’s wisdom differ. Some jurists and scholars 
promote a strict view of constitutional stare decisis.48 The best-
known articulation of this perspective comes in the joint opinion in 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey,49 the case that famously declined to 
overrule Roe v. Wade.50 The Casey plurality saw overruling as 
appropriate only in narrow circumstances such as when a 
constitutional rule 
 
Doctrine, in PRECEDENT ON THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (C.J. Peters ed.) (forthcoming 
2014). 
 44. Coronado Oil, 285 U.S. at 405–07 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). 
 45. Id. at 407–08. 
 46. Justice Brandeis provided extensive proof of this proposition in his dense and scholarly 
footnotes. See id. at 406–10 nn.1–5. 
 47. In an exceptionally valuable study, Professor Gerhardt has documented all of the Court’s 
overrulings from 1789 through 2004 and found that the Court has expressly overruled 208 
precedents and sub silentio overruled 24 precedents. See GERHARDT, supra note 26, at 9, 35. 
 48. As of the early 2000s, it seemed as if the Court as a whole had embraced the stricter 
view of stare decisis. See generally Lee, supra note 43, at 581–88 (noting that the Court has 
changed its “overruling rhetoric” and increased the weight given to considerations of stare 
decisis). However, Citizens United suggests that this strong view no longer clearly commands 
majority support. Compare Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 919–22 
(2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring), with id. at 938–42 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 49. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 50. Id. at 855 (aff’g Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)). 
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has proven to be intolerable simply in defying practical 
workability . . . [or when] related principles of law have so 
far developed as to have left the old rule no more than a 
remnant of abandoned doctrine[,] or [when] facts have so 
changed . . . as to have robbed the old rule of significant 
application or justification.51 
Absent special justification, the strict view of constitutional stare 
decisis thus directs the Court to follow its own precedent even if it 
believes that precedent was wrongly decided based on weak or 
flawed reasoning.52 
Lax and strict approaches to overruling thus essentially differ on 
the relevance granted to a constitutional case’s underlying reasoning. 
Whereas a lax view counts poor reasoning as justification for 
abandoning precedent, a strict view places little stock in the ab initio 
force of a case’s reasoning and focuses instead on reliance on the 
rule of law handed down by precedent. In a more basic sense, a lax 
view of stare decisis authorizes change in doctrine through 
overruling while a strict view promotes stability in doctrine through 
affirming. 
Although coherent arguments can be marshaled in favor of both 
lax and strict views as a general rule-of-law matter, I do not wish to 
rehearse those arguments here.53 Rather, I want to stress the 
rhetorical connection between general stare decisis arguments about 
overruling and the particular doctrinal debates in which these 
arguments arise. Despite its metadoctrinal status, Supreme Court 
Justices do not invoke stare decisis with perfect consistency across 
doctrinal contexts.54 This is no cynical observation about hypocrisy 
 
 51. See id. at 854–55 (citations omitted). 
 52. In Casey, the Court upheld Roe despite expressing doubts about its original validity. See 
id. at 855. The Court also surprised many by taking a similarly strict approach in Dickerson. See 
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) (aff’g Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 
(1986)). 
 53. The fine exchange between Professors Fallon and Paulsen well captures the general 
points in favor of strict or lax approaches. Compare Fallon, supra note 26 (stating that “stare 
decisis is not a constitutional requirement, but rather a judicial policy judgment”), with Paulsen, 
supra note 26 (arguing that stare decisis does not lack constitutional stature). 
 54. The Court’s split over abortion and same-sex intercourse provides an obvious example. 
In Casey, socially liberal justices urged a strong view of stare decisis to affirm Roe v. Wade, 
while conservatives urged overruling. Compare Casey, 505 U.S. at 854–55 (joint opinion of 
Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter), with id. at 999 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003), the script flipped as liberal justices adopted a weak stare decisis 
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on the Court. Indeed, it would be unfair and absurd to expect any 
jurist to universally commit to always supporting doctrinal change or 
to always supporting doctrinal stability. Context matters immensely. 
Within the continuum between strict and lax general attitudes toward 
precedent, there is legitimate room for persuasion about the wisdom 
of overruling any given doctrine. Stare decisis provides a useful 
rhetorical framework for expressing these particular doctrinal 
arguments. 
The stare decisis rhetorical framework changes when the debate 
shifts from the context of doctrinal overruling to that of doctrinal 
expansion. This is because the stare decisis question itself changes 
from challenging a precedent’s basic legitimacy to broadening its 
scope of application. Does stare decisis require that the Court follow 
the literal “law” laid down in a previous case, or does it permit the 
Court to follow the “spirit” of that law and extend its reach? General 
jurisprudential attitudes toward this interpretative question also vary 
along a spectrum that leaves room for argument in particular cases. 
Instead of strict to lax, I classify the spectrum of arguments 
concerning expanding the scope of precedent as moving from formal 
to justificatory. 
The key distinction underlying formal versus justificatory 
arguments is that between the “rule of law” announced in a case and 
its supporting “justification.” In the literature, the conceptual 
categories of “rule of law” and “justification” assume many 
synonyms. Thus, a “rule of law” may be variously referred to as a 
rule, law, standard, test, or proposition. Though they have different 
shades of meaning,55 all of these words express the kind of abstract 
generalization associated with the major premise of arguments—
 
position and conservatives urged fidelity to Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), which had 
upheld the prohibition on homosexual sodomy. Compare Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577 (2003) 
(Kennedy, J., for the Court), with id. at 586–87 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 55. There is, of course, a long-standing debate over whether rules or standards make better 
laws. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term—Foreword: The Justices of 
Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992) (classic account of this debate). The dispute’s 
intensity should not obscure the fact that rules and standards both state abstract “laws.” Though 
standards tend to be more open and underdetermined than rules, standards and rules both play the 
“major premise” role in argument. I thus respectfully disagree with Professor Farber’s 
characterization of debates over applying precedent as essentially tracking the debate between 
rules and standards. See Farber, supra note 26, at 1199. Instead, I see the split as between rules 
and justifications. 
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what philosopher Stephen Toulmin has called the “inference 
warrant” or “warrant” for an argument.56 Next, the “justification” for 
a rule tracks Toulmin’s concept of the “backing” for a warrant.57 
Other commonly used words expressing the concept of justification 
include rationale, grounds, purpose, goal, spirit, or policy.58 The 
justification for a rule is essentially what “stands behind” that rule 
and compels its acceptance. 
Although the distinction between rule and justification is 
philosophically sound, the concepts are frequently conflated in 
practice. When lawyers and jurists refer to a case’s holding or its 
ratio decidendi, it is often unclear whether they are referring to the 
precedent’s rule of law alone or to its rule and justification together. 
Conceptual sloppiness is partially to blame as inference warrants are 
easily confused with the backings for those warrants.59 However, 
controversy also stems from a fundamental disagreement on whether 
holding ought to include a precedent’s rule alone or its rule and 
justification together. Attitudes toward holding can also vary along 
the continuum between formal and justificatory. This explains why 
stare decisis arguments over expanding a precedent’s scope also play 
out as arguments over what actually constitutes a precedent’s 
holding. I call the competing poles in the approaches to stare decisis 
formal and justificatory. 
Under a formal approach to stare decisis, it is a case’s rule of 
law alone that binds subsequent courts. On this view, therefore, the 
rule alone constitutes a case’s holding and ratio decidendi. I call this 
approach “formal” because it refuses to look behind the formal 
command of the rule. The formal view consequently regards a law’s 
 
 56. See STEPHEN E. TOULMIN, THE USES OF ARGUMENT 91 (rev. ed. 2003) (distinguishing 
data from warrants and describing warrants as “rules, principles, inference-licenses or what you 
will”). 
 57. See id. at 96. Backing provides “assurances, without which . . . warrants themselves 
would possess neither authority nor currency.” Id. 
 58. Once again, the different shades of meaning in these words should not obscure their 
essentially similar rhetorical function in argument. Thus, even though “spirit” appears to look 
back and “goal” appears to look forward, both words signify argumentative reasons to presently 
interpret a rule one way or another. 
 59. The same sloppiness plagued philosophers as far back to Aristotle. Indeed, Stephen 
Toulmin’s work was groundbreaking for its specific articulation of how Aristotle’s syllogism 
conflated in its concept of a major premise the categories of warrant and backing. See TOULMIN, 
supra note 56, at 100–05. The conceptual clarity offered by Toulmin’s argumentative scheme is 
underappreciated in the legal academy. 
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spirit or purpose as nonbinding dictum.60 This reflects what Professor 
Schauer calls an “entrenched” view of rules.61 If a new situation 
arises in which application of a rule potentially conflicts with the 
rule’s underlying justification, the entrenched view requires that the 
rule should be followed rather than its justification.62 A formal view 
of stare decisis similarly places a premium on literal rules in case 
holdings and places less value on the putative rationale behind such 
holdings. 
By contrast, then, a justificatory approach to interpreting stare 
decisis views the command of a case’s rule primarily through the 
lens of its underlying rationale. The justificatory perspective regards 
a precedent’s holding as encompassing both the literal law set down 
and the purpose animating that law. It is not formal in that it accepts 
that a spirit stands behind a formal rule. In situations of conflict 
between literal rule and underlying justification, this view takes the 
opposite tack to the entrenched response and favors animating policy 
over the formal rule. Form thus follows purpose. Under this 
justificatory scheme, the generalization represented by the rule is not 
so firmly entrenched as to require strict adherence. 
Once again, coherent arguments can be marshaled in favor of 
both formal and justificatory views as a general rule-of-law matter. 
But once again, I do not wish to rehearse those arguments so much as 
stress the rhetorical connection between general stare decisis 
arguments about doctrinal expansion and the particular doctrinal 
debates in which they arise. Within the continuum between formal 
and justificatory attitudes, there is legitimate room for persuasion 
about what stare decisis requires in a particular case. Formal 
arguments stress rules while justificatory arguments stress the 
backing for rules. The basic hypothesis vis-à-vis doctrinal expansion 
is that justificatory approaches will generally provide stronger 
 
 60. In his defense of “neoformalism,” Professor Solum explicitly argues that a formal view 
of stare decisis can consider the purpose of a rule. See Solum, supra note 26, at 172. However, 
Solum implicitly concedes that formalists are less inclined to look at purpose than what he calls 
instrumentalists or realists. Id. In terms of a spectrum of positions then, it remains the case even 
under Solum’s framework that the more formal one’s approach to rules, the less likely purpose 
will come into play. 
 61. See generally FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES 42–52 (Tony Honore et al. 
eds., 1991) (arguing that under an entrenchment model of rules, generalizations control decisions 
even in those cases in which the generalization failed to serve its underlying justification). 
 62. See id. at 51. 
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arguments for expanding a rule’s scope while formal arguments will 
better support constraining expansion. 
The salience of these admittedly abstract distinctions and the 
tenability of my hypothesis will become clear when applied to Brady 
and due process jurisprudence. However, before turning to our case 
study, I must address a potential objection. The objection is that my 
distinction between formal and justificatory interpretations of 
precedent improperly assumes that it is possible to discern the 
semantic content of the “rule of law” in any given case. This is fair 
enough. Given how justices write opinions, identifying the precise 
rules announced in Supreme Court cases often presents difficulties 
that simply do not arise when identifying the rules stated in acts of 
Congress.63 
Although I concede the general difficulty in precisely 
articulating the rules of cases, it is not always impossible. Indeed, 
some cases are written in a way that makes identifying the 
“canonical formulation” of their rules rather easy.64 As it happens, 
this is precisely the case with Brady v. Maryland. For reasons 
explored below, identifying the relevant rule from Brady is 
uncontroversial—it has an easily identified canonical formulation. 
Indeed, I call this formulation “the Brady Rule.” Precisely because 
Brady does not suffer from the interpretative difficulties sometimes 
associated with identifying precedent rules, it is perfectly suited to 
frame a case study into the dynamics of formal versus justificatory 
arguments for expanding precedent. 
 
 63. Professor Sinclair has adjudged this difficulty as fatally undermining any rule-based 
conception of precedent. See Sinclair, supra note 31, at 385–86. However, I see Brady as 
providing a compelling enough counterexample to make plausible the project of looking for rules 
in at least some cases. 
 64. See Larry Alexander, Constrained by Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 27 (1989) 
(arguing that while not all cases have discernable rules, some do). On the canonical formulation 
of rules, see generally SCHAUER, supra note 61, at 68–72 (discussing the distinction between 
canonically formulated rules and rules without canonically inscribed formulations); Alexander, 
supra, at 17–19 (listing canonical formulation as one condition that the rule model must meet). If 
a rule has a canonical formulation, there is by definition no interpretative dispute over its 
semantic content. 
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B.  The Brady Rule and the 
Right to Untested Evidence 
Among practicing criminal lawyers and judges, Brady signifies 
more than just a single Supreme Court case. It stands for the entire 
realm of criminal procedure doctrine that deals with the prosecutorial 
obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence. As a textual matter, the 
original Brady case and its progeny all interpret the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice William Douglas’s 
1963 opinion for the Court announced its core holding in bold and 
decisive language: 
We now hold that the suppression by the prosecution 
of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates 
due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or 
to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of 
the prosecution.65 
This is the exact formulation of what I call the Brady Rule.66 The 
Brady Rule states a constitutional operative proposition about due 
process.67 In essence, the Brady Rule created a right to discovery in 
criminal cases. Doctrinal expansion controversies in Brady concern 
just how broadly or narrowly the discovery right should apply. 
Recall from the introduction that Justice Scalia protested in 
Thompson against recognizing a right to untested evidence on the 
grounds that it would impermissibly expand the substantive law of 
Brady.68 I maintain that Justice Scalia’s accusation rests upon a 
particularly formal approach to constitutional stare decisis. Though 
Justice Scalia did not state it this way, his formal logic for limiting 
the scope of the Brady Rule unfolds like this: Taken literally, the 
Brady Rule applies only to “evidence favorable to an accused.” 
Untested forensic evidence cannot be classified as “favorable to an 
accused” as its exculpatory value is unknown. Indeed, testing could 
show the evidence to be inculpatory and thus it is also potentially 
 
 65. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
 66. Throughout this Article, I also refer to the Brady Rule simply as “the Rule.” 
 67. The “constitutional operative proposition” vocabulary originates from Professor Mitch 
Berman. See Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 50–51 (2004). 
Drawing on Berman’s work, Professor Jennifer Laurin has previously identified the Brady Rule 
as a constitutional operative proposition. See Jennifer E. Laurin, Rights Translation and Remedial 
Disequilibration in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1002, 1018 (2010). 
 68. Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1369 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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unfavorable. Reading favorability out of the Rule to cover evidence 
that is only potentially exculpatory would expand Brady past 
recognizable borders. Under this formal view, the analysis would not 
continue to consider Brady’s underlying due process justification. 
This formal perspective thus reads the Brady Rule almost as a 
textualist would read a statute. As mentioned, Justice Scalia did not 
actually articulate this precise perspective in Thompson. However, 
before rehearsing Justice Scalia’s actual (and still very formal) 
argument, I want to explore the formal idea that the Brady Rule 
represents the “canonical formulation” of the operative due process 
proposition. 
As written, the Brady Rule is indeed particularly amenable to 
literal interpretation. Consider first the Rule’s prefatory “[w]e now 
hold” phrase. This wording obviously aims to remove any doubt as 
to whether the announced rule constitutes holding or dictum. Next, 
consider the level of abstraction. The Rule is self-consciously general 
as it does not mention the particular litigants, facts, or outcome of the 
controversy before it. Yet the Rule is also usefully specific in naming 
the relevant actors (prosecution, accused) and prohibited action 
(suppression of favorable evidence). In sum, the purely linguistic 
formulation of the Brady Rule has canonical qualities. 
Opinion language alone cannot suffice to make Brady’s 
operative due process proposition canonical. What really matters to 
canonicity is on-the-ground interpretative practice. By this measure, 
the Court has certainly behaved as if the Brady Rule were canonical. 
Practically every significant Brady decision directly quotes all or part 
of Justice Douglas’s original Brady Rule in its analysis.69 This 
practice of invoking Justice Douglas’s precise formulation spans 
decades and continues even in cases not directly in the Brady line.70 
 
 69. See Smith v. Cain, 132 S. Ct. 627, 630 (2012) (paraphrasing Brady Rule); Cone v. Bell, 
556 U.S. 449, 469 (2009) (same); Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 682 n.5 (2004) (direct quotation 
of entire rule); United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628 (2002) (partial quotation of Brady Rule); 
Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280 (1999) (direct quotation of entire rule); Kyles v. Whitley, 
514 U.S. 419, 432 (1995) (same); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 669 (1985) (same); 
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110 n.17 (1976) (same); Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 794 
(1972) (same); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153–54 (1972) (partial quotation of Brady 
Rule). 
 70. I consider as indirect Brady decisions those cases that conduct analysis of access-to-
evidence issues under the Sixth Amendment as well as under the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., 
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Moreover, quoting the Rule is often a vital step in the Court’s 
analysis. Major Brady-line cases effectively interrogate this single 
sentence and create doctrine by elaborating upon the meaning of its 
component phrases. 
Three quick examples demonstrate this formal notion of Brady 
doctrine as a systematic elaboration upon the Brady Rule’s 
component phrases. First, in Giglio v. United States,71 the Court 
essentially read the Rule’s phrase “evidence favorable to an accused” 
to include impeachment material.72 Second, in United States v. 
Bagley, the Court explicitly interpreted the Rule’s key phrase 
“material to guilt or punishment” and found that “evidence is 
material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the 
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different.”73 And finally, in Kyles v. Whitley,74 the 
Court held that individual prosecutors have “a duty to learn of any 
favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government’s 
behalf . . . .”75 This holding clarified that the Rule’s injunction 
against “suppression . . . by the prosecution” effectively prohibited 
the police from suppressing exculpatory evidence.76 
Though the Court has never claimed to read the Brady Rule 
“like a statute,” the relationship between the Rule’s specific text and 
the holdings in these cases certainly resembles the relationship 
between congressional law and Court precedent interpreting statutes. 
On a formal view, Giglio, Bagley, and Kyles do no more than 
implement the Brady Rule’s operative language.77 Interpretation 
must—first and foremost—be consistent with the Rule’s plain 
 
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 57 (1987) (paraphrasing Brady rule); United States v. 
Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 868 (1982) (direct quotation of entire Brady rule). 
 71. 405 U.S. 150 (1972). 
 72. See id. at 150, 155 (finding prosecutors violated due process when they failed to disclose 
that a government witness had secured a cooperation agreement in exchange for his testimony). 
 73. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682. 
 74. 514 U.S. 419 (1995). 
 75. Id. at 437. 
 76. Id.; see also Youngblood v. West Virginia, 547 U.S. 867, 869–70 (2006) (citing Kyles 
for the proposition that “Brady suppression occurs when the government fails to turn over even 
evidence that is ‘known only to police investigators and not to the prosecutor’”) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 77. Under Berman’s framework, Giglio, Bagley, and Kyles would thus be examples of 
“decision rules” implementing Brady’s constitutional operative proposition. See Berman, supra 
note 67, at 50–51; cf. Laurin, supra note 67, at 1019 (describing Brady’s materiality requirement 
as “a classic decision rule inquiry”). 
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meaning. Since the Brady Rule only applies to “evidence favorable 
to an accused,” Justice Scalia’s argument in Thompson thus makes 
formal sense.78 Untested evidence is not actually favorable—only 
potentially so. Testing evidence could theoretically prove that it is 
inculpatory, in which case it would actually become “unfavorable to 
the accused.” If the Brady Rule’s plain language alone controlled, 
Justice Scalia’s formal tack would seem strong. 
Yet despite its surface appeal, the realities of interpretative 
practice undermine a highly formal explanation of the Brady line. 
First, reconsider Kyles, which read the Rule’s phrase 
“suppression . . . by the prosecution” to also proscribe suppression by 
the police.79 Since the police and prosecution are not the same, this 
reading is at least contestable. Nevertheless, a formal account of 
Kyles remains plausible given the direct relationship between 
prosecution and police.80 However, no similarly plausible formal 
reading explains United States v. Agurs.81 In Agurs, the Court held 
that, even in absence of any defense request for Brady material, 
prosecutors have an affirmative duty to disclose evidence that is 
“clearly supportive of a claim of innocence.”82 This strains against 
the plain text of the Rule, which only prohibits “suppression . . . 
upon request” of the defense.83 The Agurs Court thus read the “upon 
request” condition right out of the Brady Rule.84 
Though formally problematic, Agurs’s removal of the “upon 
request” condition from the Rule makes perfect sense under a 
justificatory view of precedent. On a justificatory account, purpose 
trumps form. Agurs’s argument logic proceeds like this: Since one 
purpose of the Brady Rule is to protect innocence, the Rule should 
not be read to defeat this purpose. Suppressing evidence “clearly 
supportive of an innocence claim” only because the defense failed to 
request it goes against the spirit of the Rule. Therefore, the 
 
 78. Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1368–70 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 79. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437. 
 80. Both institutions are arguably species of the same “state prosecution” genus. 
 81. 427 U.S. 97 (1976). 
 82. See id. at 107, 110. 
 83. The government advanced this precise argument in its Agurs briefing. See infra note 260 
and accompanying text. 
 84. Justice Stevens, author of the Agurs opinion, later admitted as much. See infra note 299. 
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prohibition of “suppression . . . upon request” will be read to also 
prohibit suppression without a request. 
Agurs’s justificatory logic could apply to the right-to-untested-
evidence debate. Though the Brady Rule formally applies to 
evidence “favorable to the accused,” enlarging its scope to cover 
untested evidence would arguably further the Rule’s purpose of 
protecting innocence. After all, once untested evidence was tested, it 
led to John Thompson’s exoneration. This raises a question for 
Justice Scalia—If Agurs could read “upon request” out of the Rule, 
why not similarly read away the formal requirement that evidence be 
“favorable”? In response, Justice Scalia might fairly assert that 
though the Court could read away the Brady Rule’s favorability 
requirement, the germane fact is that Court has not so held until this 
point. This imagined answer closely echoes Justice Scalia’s actual 
observation in Thompson that “[i]f any of our cases establishes such 
an obligation [to disclose untested evidence], I have never read it, 
and the dissent does not cite it.”85 
As I have stressed, Justice Scalia did not make a quasi-textualist 
argument about the Brady Rule in Thompson. His logic is formal but 
does not actually rest on textual exegesis of the Brady Rule. 
Nonetheless, the textual account of Brady doctrine helps 
contextualize the still-formal nature of Justice Scalia’s actual charge 
of sub silentio expansion in Thompson. A formal reading 
demonstrates how Justice Scalia effectively anchored his argument in 
the literal favorability requirement of the Brady Rule. A formal 
account also helps elucidate Justice Scalia’s otherwise confusing 
appeal to precedent in his actual Thompson argument. 
After observing that no case affirmatively established a right to 
untested evidence, Justice Scalia argued that one case—Arizona v. 
Youngblood86—“appears to say just the opposite.”87 As Justice Scalia 
correctly noted, Youngblood held that “unless a criminal defendant 
can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve 
potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process 
 
 85. Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1369 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 86. 488 U.S. 51 (1988). 
 87. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 1369 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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of law.”88 Justice Scalia then quoted the Youngblood Court’s 
observation that 
[Brady] makes the good or bad faith of the State irrelevant 
when the State fails to disclose to the defendant material 
exculpatory evidence . . . [but] the Due Process Clause 
requires a different result when we deal with the failure of 
the State to preserve evidentiary material of which no more 
can be said than that it could have been subjected to tests, 
the results of which might have exonerated the defendant.89 
Justice Scalia then concluded that “[p]erhaps one day we will 
recognize a distinction between good-faith failures to preserve 
[potentially exculpatory evidence] and good-faith failures to turn 
such evidence over to the defense. But until we do so, a failure to 
train prosecutors to observe that distinction cannot constitute 
deliberate indifference.”90 
The logic of Justice Scalia’s substantive claim about Brady 
appears to be this—since Youngblood prohibits only bad faith 
destruction of potentially exculpatory evidence, Brady’s 
“irrespective of the good or bad faith” language means that the Rule 
cannot also apply to potentially exculpatory evidence. This reasoning 
is somewhat muddled but seems to rest on formal distinctions 
regarding potentially exculpatory evidence that were made in 
Youngblood but not in Brady.91 
Justice Scalia’s invocation of Youngblood is potentially 
shocking since the case denied relief to a man later proved innocent 
by DNA testing.92 Citing Youngblood in an opinion suggesting that 
prosecutors have no obligation to disclose potentially exculpatory 
forensic evidence seems callous in the extreme. Moreover, Justice 
Scalia’s citation to the case is puzzling as a doctrinal matter since it 
ignores seemingly key language in Chief Justice Rehnquist’s 
majority opinion. The context for the Chief Justice’s analysis was 
 
 88. Id. (quoting Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58) (emphasis added). 
 89. Id. (quoting Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 57). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Justice Scalia’s argument drifts here. He initially invokes Youngblood for the proposition 
that no substantive right to untested evidence exists under Brady, but he then phrases his 
conclusion in terms of civil liability for failure-to-train. 
 92. See Norman C. Bay, Old Blood, Bad Blood, and Youngblood: Due Process, Lost 
Evidence, and the Limits of Bad Faith, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 241, 275–78 (2008). 
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Larry Youngblood’s claim that police had failed to properly preserve 
semen evidence that could have proved him innocent of child 
molestation.93 Chief Justice Rehnquist began by quoting Agurs and 
the Brady Rule. He then wrote: 
There is no question but that the State complied with 
Brady and Agurs here. The State disclosed relevant police 
reports to respondent . . . . The State provided respondent’s 
expert with the laboratory reports and notes prepared by the 
police criminologist, and respondent’s expert had access to 
the swab and to the clothing . . . . 
If respondent is to prevail on federal constitutional 
grounds, then, it must be because of some constitutional 
duty over and above that imposed by cases such as Brady 
and Agurs.94 
In this passage, Chief Justice Rehnquist plainly characterizes the 
State’s disclosure of the laboratory reports and granting of access to 
untested evidence as “compl[ying] with Brady.”95 This arguably 
supports the proposition that prosecutors do have a Brady obligation 
to disclose the existence of material untested evidence. 
If Youngblood at least implies that Brady requires disclosure of 
untested evidence, why in his Thompson concurrence did Justice 
Scalia cite the case for the precise opposite proposition? I suggest 
this move is best understood as evincing a formal approach to 
constitutional precedent. A formal reading of Youngblood essentially 
dismisses Chief Justice Rehnquist’s discussion of compliance with 
Brady as irrelevant dicta. Justice Scalia finds Youngblood’s holding 
in the two sentences he quotes and ignores everything else. The ratio 
decidendi reduces to this text and does not include underlying 
justification. In this way, Justice Scalia approaches the Youngblood 
Rule in much the same way as he approaches the Brady Rule—as an 
entrenched generalization that requires little inquiry beyond its plain 
language.96 
 
 93. See Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 52–55. 
 94. Id. at 55–56. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Of course, an alternative explanation of Justice Scalia’s reading of Youngblood is 
possible. This explanation would characterize Justice Scalia’s reading as essentially dishonest 
rather than formal/textualist. Ultimately, Justice Scalia’s subjective intent in making his argument 
does not matter for my analysis. I am interested in understanding and answering the best 
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Of course, Justice Scalia’s formal argument is entirely 
contestable. Unfortunately, the Thompson dissenters did not tender a 
justificatory response about the purpose or spirit of Brady being the 
protection of innocence.97 In Part V below, I advance the response 
the dissent might have made. However, I must concede up front that 
the purpose of Brady is itself contested. Only the substantive due 
process school credits Brady with a strong innocence-protecting 
purpose. Followers of the competing procedural school see the 
purpose of Brady as limited to ensuring fairness at trial. It remains 
subject to debate whether recognition of a right to untested evidence 
is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the Brady Rule. 
A complete understanding of the right-to-untested-evidence 
controversy—or of other contested expansions of Brady’s scope—
thus requires more than the observation that Justice Scalia’s 
argument is formal. It also requires an analysis of the deeper 
doctrinal dialectic between procedural and substantive schools. Parts 
III and IV below undertake this analysis by mapping Brady’s origins 
and progeny. Part III’s analysis of Brady’s origins reveals that 
followers of the early substantive school continually expanded due 
process precedent via justificatory arguments. Part IV’s analysis of 
Brady’s progeny shows how the procedural school eventually seized 
control of the doctrine while deploying formal stare decisis 
arguments. While I have stressed that the persuasive strength of stare 
decisis arguments depends on doctrinal context, these following 
Parts demonstrate how metadoctrinal stare decisis argumentation 
itself helps constitute context. 
Before turning to Part III, a lurking criticism needs to be 
confronted. This criticism suggests that Justice Scalia’s substantive 
Brady argument in Thompson has minimal relevance or importance 
to Brady doctrine. After all, Justice Scalia’s argument came in a 
concurring rather than majority opinion, and Thompson was a civil 
rather than criminal case. One might therefore conclude that Justice 
 
argument against recognizing a right to untested evidence in Brady doctrine. In my view, the best 
argument for this position is a highly formal one like the one Justice Scalia adopts in Thompson. 
 97. Rather, as Justice Scalia sarcastically observed, the dissenters relied on the concession 
by Connick’s counsel that a Brady violation had occurred. Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 
1350, 1369 n.5 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Given the effort the dissent has expended 
persuading us that Connick’s understanding of Brady is profoundly misguided, its newfound trust 
in his expertise on the subject is, to say the least, surprising.”). 
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Scalia’s opinion does not state “the law” and thus should not cause 
concern. Despite its superficial appeal, I argue that this criticism 
misunderstands the real dynamics of doctrinal evolution. 
First, the fact that Justice Scalia advanced his argument in a 
concurrence hardly means it could not influence Brady’s future 
development. As shown below, concurring opinions—including 
Justice White’s concurrence in Brady itself—have already affected 
the course of Brady doctrine just as they have influenced other areas 
of jurisprudence.98 Moreover, dissenting opinions—which have even 
less claim to “the law”—have also impacted the development of 
Brady and other due process doctrines.99 Majority, concurring, and 
dissenting opinions all play a role in the dialectic and cannot be 
lightly ignored. 
Second, the fact that Thompson is a civil case also does not 
preclude its influence over Brady criminal doctrine. As Professor 
Laurin has demonstrated, the course of constitutional criminal 
doctrine can shift because of “borrowing” from civil law.100 And 
indeed, I show below how Brady doctrine has already been 
dramatically affected by borrowing from disparate areas of criminal 
law.101 Once again, Justice Scalia’s substantive Brady analysis 
cannot be dismissed simply because Thompson more directly 
concerned failure-to-train liability. 
As shown in the next two Parts, the evolution of due process 
doctrine is complex and can be influenced by what appear to be 
unlikely sources. To fully understand the potential significance of 
 
 98. Justice White’s Brady concurrence called for a limit on constitutionalizing discovery and 
inspired the modern procedural school. See infra Part IV and Figure 2. Justice Fortas’s 
concurrence in Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66 (1967), similarly inspired the substantive school. 
See infra Part IV and Figure 2. Outside of Brady, the canonical example of an influential 
concurrence over constitutional law is Justice Jackson’s opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. 
v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). See Epstein & Jacobi, supra note 
31, at 60 n.85. 
 99. Justice Holmes’s dissent in Frank v. Magnum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915), is an important root 
in Brady’s family tree. See infra Part III and Figure 1. Justice Harlan’s dissent in Giles is a key 
ancestor of Bagley. See infra Part IV and Figure 2. For an analysis of dissenting opinions’ 
influence over economic liberty and incorporation due process doctrine, see Starger, Exile on 
Main Street, supra note 21. 
 100. See Jennifer E. Laurin, Trawling for Herring: Lessons in Doctrinal Borrowing and 
Convergence, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 670 (2011). 
 101. See infra note 289 and accompanying text (describing role of borrowing in justifying 
Bagley). 
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Justice Scalia’s Thompson concurrence, we must therefore turn to the 
central task of mapping the competing lines in the Brady dialectic. 
III.  DUE PROCESS ROOTS: 
COMPETING BRADY ANCESTRIES 1868–1963 
Is the Brady Rule a creature of procedural or substantive due 
process? For good or ill, there is no simple or uncontroversial answer 
to this question. On the one hand, as Professor Israel has noted, 
Brady announced a “free-standing due process right.”102 Israel’s 
classification derives from the complete absence of any reference to 
criminal discovery in the Constitution or its amendments. Like rights 
to abortion or same-sex intercourse, Brady’s discovery right is 
unenumerated and thus a substantive creation of the Court. On the 
other hand, the Brady Rule imposes a disclosure obligation on 
prosecutors that is inextricably bound with criminal procedure. In 
this way, the Brady Rule provides a procedural guarantee that trials 
will not occur without allowing defendants access to exculpatory 
evidence. Brady arguably shares procedural and substantive due 
process qualities. Perhaps because of such difficulties, the Court 
itself has never directly spoken on Brady’s proper doctrinal 
classification.103 
Regardless of classification, Brady is a Court creation. No 
serious jurist or scholar has ever claimed that the Brady Rule derives 
from an original public understanding of the meaning of “due 
process” in 1791 or 1868.104 And yet, though clearly a product of 
Warren Court activism, Brady has also never faced any noteworthy 
 
 102. See Jerold H. Israel, Free-Standing Due Process and Criminal Procedure: The Supreme 
Court’s Search for Interpretative Guidelines, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 303, 390–91 & n.498 (2001). 
 103. In United States v. Ruiz, Justice Breyer did analyze a Brady question using a procedural 
due process balancing test. See Unites States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 631 (2002) (citing Ake v. 
Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985)). This citation led Professor Avery to conclude that Brady was 
a Mathews procedural due process right. See Michael Avery, Paying for Silence: The Liability of 
Police Officers Under Section 1983 for Suppressing Exculpatory Evidence, 13 TEMP. POL. & CIV. 
RTS. L. REV. 1, 26–27 (2003) (explaining how the Ake test is identical to the classic procedural 
due process test under Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)). However, Mathews’s 
applicability to Brady was rejected by a more recent opinion by Chief Justice Roberts. See Dist. 
Attorney’s Office v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2332, n.3 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting 
Chief Justice Roberts’s rejection of the Mathews test). No Court opinion has formally declared 
Brady a procedural or substantive due process right. 
 104. These dates correspond to the ratification of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, 
respectively. 
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originalist critique. This is because the right to criminal discovery 
derived from Brady fundamentally differs from the other Court-
created rights typically targeted by originalist theorists. Unlike rights 
to abortion or same-sex intercourse, no moral tradition is offended by 
Brady’s substantive concern with innocence. And unlike more 
controversial procedural protections the Court has read into the 
Constitution—the exclusionary rule and Miranda warnings stand as 
obvious examples—Brady does not ever exclude evidence of guilt to 
frustrate truth-seeking in criminal trials. 
Yet the absence of originalist critique should not obscure 
Brady’s contested origins and development. After all, ours is an 
adversarial system of criminal justice and the Brady Rule favors 
criminal defendants. In broad strokes, those who sympathize with the 
criminal-defense bar favor an expansive substantive conception of 
Brady, while those sympathetic to the prosecution understand Brady 
as a limited procedural mechanism. This Part maps the emergence of 
the competing procedural and substantive due process schools and 
analyzes the history culminating in Brady. Part III.A presents the 
opinion map for this Part and briefly explains the general schema. 
Part III.B breaks down the due process dialectic prior to Brady, while 
Part III.C analyzes Brady itself. 
A.  Explanation of Mapping Schema 
Figure 1 below charts Brady’s due process roots. Each triangle 
on the map represents a Court opinion; the case name appears above 
the opinion and its author’s name appears below. The opinion’s year 
is shown on the X-axis while the number of votes it received is on 
the Y-axis; all points above the dashed line are thus majority 
opinions. Opinion triangles point either up or down. In Figure 1, all 
the triangles pointing up are blue and represent opinions that found a 
due process right favoring criminal defendants (or, if written in 
dissent, that would have found a due process right). These opinions 
are the direct ancestors of Brady—what I call the substantive school. 
Red triangles pointing down represent opinions denying the 
existence of a due process right. This is thus the weak due process 
right line—later associated with the procedural school opposing 
Brady’s expansion. Figure 1 thus shows how the procedural school 
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When dotted arrows join opinions, I provide argument to justify the 
link. Thus, the dotted arrow connecting Justice White’s concurrence 
in Brady back to Justice McReynolds’s dissent in Moore requires 
justification because Justice White did not explicitly cite Moore in 
his opinion.106 
Taken as a whole, the map graphs the fortunes of competing 
doctrinal schools. The schools exist in familial lines of opinions. 
Subsequent opinions descend from earlier ones and share lineage and 
heritage. (To emphasize the importance of such familial connections, 
an opinion triangle grows in size as the number of citations to it 
increases.) The genealogical metaphor suggested by this depiction 
echoes the common practice of referring to “lines” of cases or to a 
leading case “and its progeny.” However, this depiction refines the 
usual metaphor by mapping the relationships between opinions rather 
than between cases. Opinions have authors, which, unlike faceless 
attribution to “the Court,” directly implies personal agency and the 
ideological commitments of individuals.107 
Before specifically analyzing Figure 1, I want to emphasize that 
none of the opinion maps presented herein purport to chart every 
single relevant opinion from the period in question. The maps are not 
the territory. The point of the opinion maps is not to provide utterly 
exhaustive detail so much as to chart the main competing substantive 
and procedural due process lines. To deploy another analogy, Figures 
1–3 are like maps of constellations. From a sparkling universe of 
opinions, I draw lines between what I see as the brightest stars. Like 
constellations, the real power in the connections drawn lies less in 
the raw images than in the stories it allows the observer to tell. 
 
 106. This argument is presented in Part III.C, infra. 
 107. Though ideological commitment forms a key part of the story, this does not mean that 
the history of Brady doctrine neatly reduces to a contest between “liberal” and “conservative” 
schools. Modern “liberal” and “conservative” categories did not coalesce until the middle of the 
twentieth century. See, e.g., Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point 
Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953–1999, 10 POL. 
ANALYSIS 134 (2002) (examining attitudinalist scoring of liberal and conservative judicial 
leanings beginning in 1953). By contrast, “due process” is an ancient idea whose meaning has 
been contested since the Magna Carta. In particular, the personal ideological commitments of 
post–Civil War Justices do not neatly align with our modern conceptions of liberal or 
conservative. 
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B.  Brady’s Ancestry: 
Rise of the Substantive School 
The basic story of Brady’s contested due process origins is set 
out in Figure 1. The earliest data point is the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Of course, the Amendment’s “nor shall any state deprive any person 
of life [or] liberty . . . without due process of law” takes its due 
process language from the Fifth Amendment and applies it against 
the States.108 Although this language provides a textual basis for the 
doctrine that follows, the text itself has played no meaningful role in 
the criminal due process dialectic. For the most part, the competing 
lines clash over proper interpretations of prior due process caselaw. 
The mode of constitutional argumentation is thus quintessentially 
doctrinal. 
The competing opinion lines in Figure 1 thus reveal the import 
of this map. Opinions in the blue line are Brady’s direct 
predecessors. In chronological order, the opinions in this line are 
Frank v. Magnum (Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes dissenting, 
1915);109 Moore v. Dempsey (Justice Holmes for the Court, 1923);110 
Mooney v. Holohan (per curiam, 1935);111 Pyle v. Kansas (Justice 
Frank Murphy for the Court, 1942);112 Napue v. Illinois (Chief 
Justice Earl Warren for the Court, 1959);113 and Brady v. Maryland 
(Justice William Douglas for the Court, 1963).114 Opinions in the red 
 
 108. See U.S. CONST. amend V (declaring that in the context of criminal cases, no person 
“shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law” without referencing 
the “deprivor”). The Bill of Rights did not originally apply against the States. See Barron ex rel. 
Tiernan v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 247 (1833). Since federal criminal law was very 
underdeveloped prior to the Civil War, the Court had effectively no criminal due process 
jurisprudence before it was called on to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 109. Frank v. Magnum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915). Frank was a 7–2 decision. Justice Mahlon 
Pitney delivered the opinion of the Court. Id. at 324. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. wrote a 
dissent joined by Justice Charles Evans Hughes. Id. at 345 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 110. Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923). Moore was a 7–2 decision. Justice Holmes 
delivered the opinion of the Court. Id. at 87. Justice James McReynolds wrote a dissent in which 
Justice George Sutherland concurred. Id. at 92, 102 (McReynolds, J., dissenting). 
 111. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935). Mooney was a 9–0 decision delivered per 
curiam with no dissents. Id. at 109. 
 112. Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942). Pyle was a 9–0 decision. Justice Frank Murphy 
delivered the opinion of the Court. Id. at 213. 
 113. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959). Napue was a 9–0 decision. Chief Justice Earl 
Warren delivered the opinion of the Court. Id. at 265. 
 114. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Brady was a 6–1–2 decision. Justice William 
Douglas wrote the opinion for the Court. Id. at 84. Justice Byron White wrote a separate opinion. 
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line represent the competing tradition that opposed the due process 
expansion leading to Brady. In order, these opinions are Hurtado v. 
California (Justice Stanley Matthews for the Court, 1884);115 Frank 
v. Magnum (Justice Mahlon Pitney for the Court, 1915); Moore v. 
Dempsey (Justice James McReynolds dissenting, 1923); and Brady v. 
Maryland (Justice Byron White concurring, 1963). 
The earliest opinion in this dialectic is Justice Matthews’s 1884 
opinion for the Court in Hurtado. This case represented the Court’s 
first major ruling on what due process requires of the criminal 
process.116 For present purposes, Justice Matthews’s opinion is most 
significant for articulating the baseline rule that criminal due process 
requires that a defendant be given notice and the opportunity to be 
heard.117 “Notice and opportunity to be heard” captures the 
essentially procedural conception of due process that initially held 
sway over the Court’s jurisprudence. Under this conception, a state’s 
criminal procedure comports with due process so long as it provides 
notice and opportunity—unless it otherwise falls afoul of 
“fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of 
all our civil and political institutions.”118 In Hurtado, Justice 
Matthews applied this rule and found that California’s capital 
prosecution of Joseph Hurtado without grand jury indictment 
comported with due process.119 
While Hurtado provides the procedural baseline, the competing 
substantive view does not really enter the dialectic until 1915’s 
Frank.120 Frank was the first in a series of racially and politically 
 
Id. at 91 (White, J., concurring in judgment). Justice John Marshall Harlan II dissented and was 
joined by Justice Hugo Black. Id. at 92 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 115. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884). Hurtado was an 8–1 decision. Justice 
Stanley Matthews wrote the opinion for the Court. Id. at 519. Justice John Marshall Harlan wrote 
a solo dissent. Id. at 538 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 116. Israel, supra note 102, at 306. 
 117. Justice Matthews relied on earlier noncriminal precedent for the notice-and-opportunity-
to-be-heard proposition. See Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 533 (quoting Kennard v. Louisiana ex rel, 92 
U.S. 480 (1875)). 
 118. See Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 535. 
 119. Id. at 538. This result is notable because the Fifth Amendment clearly mandates grand 
jury indictments in federal prosecutions. 
 120. See generally id. at 538–58 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (declining to question whether the 
Court needed to look behind the forms of procedure and inquire into whether a miscarriage of 
justice had occurred). As important as Justice Harlan’s dissent is to the Court’s “incorporation” 
dialectic, it plays no significant role in Brady’s history. See Starger, Exile on Main Street, supra 
note 21, at 1290 (analyzing influence of Justice Harlan’s dissent over incorporation doctrine). 
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charged cases reviewed by the Court—Moore and Mooney followed. 
In all these cases, the State provided the defendant notice and 
opportunity to be heard, but the question was whether a miscarriage 
of justice occurred despite formal procedural protections. The 
emerging substantive school advocated looking behind procedural 
form to the substance of justice. 
The question of substantive justice loomed large when Leo 
Frank asked the Court to issue writ of habeas corpus. To many, 
Frank was a victim of great injustice.121 He stood convicted of the 
capital rape-murder of Mary Phagan, a thirteen-year-old employee of 
his at the National Pencil Factory in Atlanta, Georgia.122 Critically, 
Frank was a Jew and Phagan a Christian.123 Frank’s case caused 
tumult in the South as sensational newspaper coverage fanned anti-
Semitic flames.124 Before the Court, Frank argued that his trial had 
been conducted under a threat of mob violence and that mob 
domination had denied him due process of law.125 
The Court ruled against Frank. Writing for a seven-Justice 
majority, Justice Pitney invoked Hurtado for the proposition that 
a criminal prosecution in the courts of a State . . . conducted 
according to the settled course of judicial proceedings as 
established by the law of the State, so long as it includes 
notice, and a hearing, or an opportunity to be heard, before 
a court of competent jurisdiction, according to established 
modes of procedure, is “due process” in the constitutional 
sense.126 
 
 121. The Anti-Defamation League was actually founded in 1913 as a direct response to the 
Frank trial. See Georgia Pardons Lynching Victim, ADL’s First Case, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 12, 
1986, at A11. 
 122. See Eric M. Freedman, Milestones in Habeas Corpus: Part II Leo Frank Lives: 
Untangling the Historical Roots of Meaningful Federal Habeas Corpus Review of State 
Convictions, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1467, 1474 (2000). 
 123. Emanuel Margolis, Habeas Corpus: The No-Longer Great Writ, 98 DICK. L. REV. 557, 
558 (1994). 
 124. Id. 
 125. Frank v. Magnum, 237 U.S. 309, 324–25 (1915). 
 126. Id. at 326 (citing Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 535 (1884)). Justice Pitney cited 
other cases for this proposition here as well. It deserves mention that Frank’s case involved 
important questions of federal habeas jurisdiction. Most of the cases Justice Pitney cites in his 
opinion serve as authority justifying his habeas ruling. Hurtado is the most important due process 
case he cites. For a discussion focused on the technical habeas aspects of Frank, see generally 
Freedman, supra note 122. 
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Under the “notice and opportunity to be heard” rule, Frank had 
received due process. This is because Frank’s claim about mob 
domination had been heard and rejected by the appellate and 
supreme courts of Georgia.127 These subsequent courts conducted 
their review “under circumstances wholly apart from the atmosphere 
of the trial, and free from any suggestion of mob domination.”128 
Justice Pitney flinched at extending due process to “impair the power 
of the States to repress and punish crime.”129 
Justice Holmes dissented and gave first voice to the substantive 
perspective that due process inquiries cannot end with notice and 
opportunity. Relying on his own considerable authority, rather than 
any prior caselaw, Justice Holmes wrote: 
Whatever disagreement there may be as to the scope of the 
phrase “due process of law,” there can be no doubt that it 
embraces the fundamental conception of a fair trial, with 
opportunity to be heard. Mob law does not become due 
process of law by securing the assent of a terrorized jury. 
We are not speaking of mere disorder, or mere irregularities 
in procedure, but a case where the processes of justice are 
actually subverted.130 
Justice Holmes quickly dismissed Justice Pitney’s worries that 
exercising federal habeas jurisdiction would violate the principle of 
comity and impair the State’s authority to punish the guilty. Instead, 
Justice Holmes appealed to “the supremacy of the law and of the 
Federal Constitution.”131 Closing in strong moral language, Justice 
Holmes declared it “our duty . . . to declare lynch law as little valid 
when practiced by a regularly drawn jury as when administered by 
one elected by a mob intent on death.”132 
Frank thus presents side by side the nascent doctrinal 
philosophies of competing due process schools. Justice Pitney looked 
to the established forms of procedure and judged the whole state 
 
 127. Frank, 237 U.S. at 312–16 (reviewing procedural history). 
 128. Id. at 333. 
 129. Id. at 337. 
 130. Id. at 347 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 131. Id. at 349. 
 132. Id. at 350. 
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apparatus as formally sound.133 Justice Holmes advocated piercing 
the form and independently assessing whether substantive justice 
was done.134 To be sure, the dispute did not involve a wholly 
categorical disagreement on what due process required. Justice 
Holmes did not argue that the federal courts were free to second-
guess state-court judgments that met formal procedural requirements. 
He stressed instead the particular gravity of the allegations in Frank’s 
case.135 For his part, Justice Pitney agreed that “if a trial is in fact 
dominated by a mob . . . so that there is an actual interference with 
the course of justice, there is . . . a departure from due process of law 
in the proper sense of that term.”136 However, he emphasized that 
Georgia had a sound corrective process, which had in fact previously 
granted new trials when mob violence rendered trials unfair.137 
While only Justice Pitney’s majority opinion formally assumed 
stare decisis status, Justice Holmes’s dissent turned out to be more 
influential in the doctrine. To understand why, it is first important to 
realize that Justice Holmes correctly apprehended the vicious reality 
of mob violence in Frank’s case. After losing in the Supreme Court, 
Frank’s lawyers managed to persuade Georgia’s governor to 
commute Frank’s death sentence to life.138 Outraged anti-Semitic 
mobs subsequently exploded into violence around the state.139 A 
month later, a party led by eminent citizens abducted Frank from jail 
and then lynched him in Mary Phagan’s hometown.140 The horror of 
this injustice is compounded by the fact that Frank was almost 
certainly innocent.141 This factual context informed the legal 
redemption of Justice Holmes’s Frank dissent in Moore. 
 
 133. Id. at 345 (majority opinion) (“In all of these proceedings the State, through its courts, 
has retained jurisdiction over him, has accorded to him the fullest right and opportunity to be 
heard according to the established modes of procedure . . . .”). 
 134. Id. at 346 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[H]abeas corpus cuts through all form and goes to 
the very tissue of the structure. It comes in from the outside, not in subordination to the 
proceedings, and although every form may have been preserved opens the inquiry whether they 
have been more than an empty shell.”). 
 135. Id. at 349 (majority opinion). 
 136. Id. at 335. Depending on how draft opinions were circulated, this concession may have 
been made in direct response to Justice Holmes’s sharp dissent. 
 137. Id. (citing Collier v. State, 42 S.E. 226 (1902); Myers v. State, 25 S.E. 252 (1895)). 
 138. Freedman, supra note 122, at 1495–96. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 1497. 
 141. The only uncertainty derives from the fact that there is no one hundred percent 
conclusive evidence of innocence such as a DNA test. In 1983, the Georgia Board of Pardons and 
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Decided in 1923, Moore was another Court encounter with mob 
justice.142 This time the violence arose out of a massive race riot that 
occurred in 1919 in Phillips County, Arkansas.143 The riot lasted 
days, and rampaging whites killed between 200 and 250 African 
Americans.144 Four whites were also killed in the violence before 
federal troops restored order.145 In the aftermath, a series of grand 
jury indictments and hasty trials resulted in seventy-nine convictions 
of black men for the murder of whites.146 Twelve men received death 
sentences.147 After a complicated path through Arkansas and federal 
courts, seven defendants who were all convicted of murdering the 
same man—Clinton Lee—ended up in a consolidated case before the 
Court in Moore.148 
Now writing for a seven-Justice majority, Justice Holmes found 
that the defendants’ allegations of mob violence and intimidation 
stated a valid due process claim. Justice Holmes agreed with the 
appellants that “although [the original proceedings were] a trial in 
form, [they] were only a form, and . . . the appellants were hurried to 
a conviction under the pressure of a mob.”149 For the proposition that 
this empty form violated due process, Justice Holmes cited no cases 
at all except for Frank.150 Here Justice Holmes seized upon Justice 
Pitney’s begrudging dictum from Frank that a trial dominated by a 
mob would violate due process if it caused an “actual interference 
with the course of justice.”151 In dissent, Justice McReynolds 
strongly objected to Justice Holmes’s reading. He accused the Moore 
majority of putting the real Frank doctrine aside and adopting “the 
views expressed by the minority of the Court in that cause.”152 To 
 
Paroles ruled that the evidence did not prove Frank was innocent. See Georgia Pardons Victim 70 
Years After Lynching, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1986, at A16. However, in 1986, the Board reversed 
itself and granted a posthumous pardon, stating that “such a standard of proof, especially for a 70-
year-old case, is almost impossible to satisfy.” Id. 
 142. Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923). 
 143. Freedman, supra note 122, at 1502. 
 144. See generally id. at 1502–04 (analyzing different historical accounts of the violence). 
 145. Id. at 1504. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 1505–21 (detailing procedural history of cases involving the two sets of defendants 
(Ware v. State, 252 S.W. 934 (1923), and Moore)). 
 149. Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 87 (1923). 
 150. Id. at 90–91 (citing Frank v. Magnum, 237 U.S. 309, 335 (1915)). 
 151. Id. (citing Frank, 237 U.S. at 335). 
 152. Id. at 93 (McReynolds, J., dissenting). 
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back up his claim, Justice McReynolds quoted seven complete 
paragraphs from Frank that put Justice Pitney’s mob-domination 
quote in its original context.153 
Though Justice Holmes technically quoted the Frank majority, 
his reasoning in Moore directly resonated with his prior dissent. In 
Moore, Justice Holmes once again viewed due process as demanding 
an inquiry into the ends of justice rather than a polite review of the 
means: 
[I]f the case is that the whole proceeding is a mask—that 
counsel, jury and judge were swept to the fatal end by an 
irresistible wave of public passion, and that the State Courts 
failed to correct the wrong, neither perfection in the 
machinery for correction nor the possibility that the trial 
court and counsel saw no other way of avoiding an 
immediate outbreak of the mob can prevent this Court from 
securing to the petitioners their constitutional rights.154 
On the other hand, Justice McReynolds’s dissent echoed the 
central themes of the Frank majority—the importance of deferring to 
state criminal processes, confidence in the integrity of state-court 
review, and suspicion of defendants’ claims. 
These relationships between arguments explain why Figure 1 
shows a dotted arrow pointing back from Holmes’s majority opinion 
in Moore to his dissent in Frank.155 Though not explicitly linked by 
textual citation (Justice Holmes did not cite his Frank dissent in 
Moore), the opinions share a deeper hermeneutic connection. Beyond 
a common author, they also advance the same tradition—advocating 
a strong substantive role for due process. Moore marks the first case 
in which freestanding due process found majority approval.156 It also 
marks the beginning of the substantive due process school’s rise. 
This doctrinal changing of the guard necessarily involved a lax 
approach to stare decisis. In truth, McReynolds accurately captured 
Justice Holmes’s disregard for Frank, and it is fair to say that Moore 
effectively overruled Frank sub silentio. Of course, Justice Holmes’s 
 
 153. Id. at 94–96 (quoting Frank en bloc). 
 154. Id. at 86, 91 (majority opinion). 
 155. Since Justice McReynolds did directly cite the Moore majority, Figure 1’s arrow 
connecting Justice McReynolds’s opinion back to Justice Pitney’s Moore opinion is solid. 
 156. Cf. Israel, supra note 102, at 374 (arguing Moore was the first case in which the Court 
found a due process violation that did not involve a parallel violation of a specific guarantee). 
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lax approach made sense given the Frank debacle and the 
contemporary realities of endemic racism and unchecked lynching. It 
also comes as no surprise that Justice Holmes delivered the stare 
decisis blow. After all, he is the author of that most famous aphorism 
critiquing slavish adherence to precedent—“It is revolting to have no 
better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the 
time of Henry IV.”157 
After Moore, the doctrinal question became how far the new 
substantive due process rule would reach. Moore showed that mob 
domination defeated due process even if notice and opportunity to be 
heard were formally present. The effective scope of the rule was 
subsequently extended in a string of unanimous cases—Mooney, 
Pyle, and Napue—that ultimately led to Brady and the creation of a 
due process right to discovery in criminal cases. During this period 
of expansion, the procedural school fell out of favor. This process 
began in Mooney. 
The Supreme Court’s 1935 per curiam opinion in Mooney is the 
most prominent single ancestor of Brady. Though its significance to 
due process is great, the opinion played a minor role in Tom 
Mooney’s long odyssey to prove his innocence. A militant-left labor 
radical, Mooney was arrested in 1916 on a mass-murder charge 
arising out of the bombing of a pro-war rally in San Francisco that 
killed nine people.158 Mooney’s subsequent conviction likely rested 
upon false and perjured testimony.159 At the time, Mooney’s case 
became an international cause célèbre for the radical left. Strictly 
speaking, Mooney did not win relief in the Supreme Court.160 
However, after decades of mass demonstrations and protracted court 
battles, Governor Cuthbert Olson finally granted Mooney a full 
pardon on innocence grounds in 1939.161 
 
 157. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897). 
 158. See Rebecca Roiphe, Lawyering at the Extremes: The Representation of Tom Mooney, 
1916–1939, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1731, 1731 (2009). Mooney had previously been acquitted of 
transporting explosives for the purpose of destroying the electrical transmission lines. Because of 
his radical politics and penchant for explosives, Mooney became the primary suspect for the San 
Francisco bombing despite the absence of any real evidence indicating guilt. Id. at 1738. 
 159.  Id. at 1740–44 (discussing evidence). 
 160. The per curiam opinion denied Mooney leave to file a habeas petition and Mooney was 
forced to return to California courts for ultimately unsuccessful litigation. See Mooney v. 
Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 115 (1935); Roiphe, supra note 158, at 1753 n.110, 1754–56. 
 161. Roiphe, supra note 158, at 1759. 
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Mooney is significant for our stare decisis study because it 
expanded due process doctrine to prohibit state subornation of 
perjury. In so doing, the Court publically rejected the intensely 
procedural arguments of the California Attorney General (AG). In 
his brief to the Court, the AG argued that Mooney’s “assertions 
relate not to the process of law followed in the petitioner’s case but 
relate to the credibility of the evidence produced against petitioner 
and to the good faith of the prosecuting attorney.” 162 Relying on 
Frank and Hurtado, the AG asserted that due process merely 
required that the defendant be given “notice, and a hearing, or an 
opportunity to be heard.”163 He then protested that 
petitioner would persuade this court to change the accepted 
meaning of the word “process” and to so broaden it as to 
include that which has never been regarded as process by 
any court in the history of our country. He would have the 
meaning of the due process clause expanded into a 
guarantee against the presentation of false evidence.164 
Notably, the AG’s protest against expansion of the scope of due 
process is grounded in a formal stare decisis argument. Since 
Mooney undeniably had notice and opportunity in state courts, the 
AG characterized his quest for due process relief as unsupported by 
precedent.165 
Of course, the AG’s formal reading of due process doctrine was 
contestable. After summarizing the AG’s due process arguments, the 
Supreme Court’s per curiam opinion bluntly rejected them: “We are 
unable to approve this narrow view of the requirement of due 
process.”166 The requirement of due process, the Court wrote, 
cannot be deemed to be satisfied by mere notice and hearing 
if a State has contrived a conviction through the pretense of 
a trial which in truth is but used as a means of depriving a 
defendant of liberty through a deliberate deception of court 
 
 162. Return to the Order to Show Cause Why Leave to File Petition for Writ of Habeas 
Corpus Should Not Be Granted at 2, Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 [hereinafter Mooney 
AG’s Brief]. 
 163. Id. at 4 (quoting Frank v. Magnum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915) (citing Hurtado v. California, 
110 U.S. 516, 535 (1884))). 
 164. Id. at 17. 
 165. Id. at 6–7, 16–17. 
 166. Mooney, 294 U.S. at 112 (emphasis added). 
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and jury by the presentation of testimony known to be 
perjured. Such a contrivance by a State to procure the 
conviction and imprisonment of a defendant is as 
inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of justice as is 
the obtaining of a like result by intimidation.167 
As authority for its substantive conception of due process, the 
Court cited Frank and Moore.168 However, the Mooney Court did not 
quote any formal rule from Frank or Moore and apply it to the case 
before it. Rather, it analogized to mob intimidation and invoked the 
“rudimentary demands of justice.”169 This was an essentially 
justificatory reading of stare decisis. 
Mooney’s due process principle effectively authorized federal 
review of the good faith of prosecuting attorneys. When prosecutors 
acted in bad faith by suborning perjury, they reduced procedural 
protections to an empty form. Notice and hearing alone cannot 
protect against bad faith deception and perjured testimony. To 
protect the ends rather than the means of justice, Mooney read a 
substantive due process principle into the doctrine. Mooney’s 
principle was easily applied in the final two cases before Brady 
itself—Pyle and Napue. 
In Pyle, the Court reviewed a pro se habeas petition on a state 
murder charge.170 On behalf of a unanimous Court, Justice Murphy 
noted that allegations of perjury as well as the “deliberate 
suppression . . . of evidence favorable to [defendant]” stated a viable 
due process claim.171 For this proposition, Justice Murphy cited 
Mooney alone.172 Even though Mooney itself had no language about 
“deliberate suppression of evidence,” the Pyle Court apparently 
found deliberate suppression inconsistent with Mooney’s spirit. In 
 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 113 (citing Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 89, 90–91 (1923); Frank, 237 U.S. at 
335). 
 169. Id. at 112. 
 170. Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 214 (1942). Pyle’s pro se petition named three witnesses 
who he claimed were forced either to lie or not testify by the prosecution. Pyle also claimed that 
evidence at a later trial held after his direct appeal contained evidence that exonerated him. Id. 
 171. Id. at 215–16. The Court found that Pyle’s claims, if proved, would state a violation of 
constitutional rights. Ultimately, the Court remanded the case back to the Kansas Supreme Court. 
Id. 
 172. Id. at 216 (citing Mooney, 294 U.S. 103). 
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short, the Court once again adopted a justificatory view of stare 
decisis. 
This pattern continued with the Court’s 1959 opinion in 
Napue.173 In this murder prosecution, the State’s principal eyewitness 
falsely testified that he had received no deals in exchange for his 
testimony.174 Writing for another unanimous Court, Chief Justice 
Warren found that this use of false testimony violated due process.175 
To back his argument, Chief Justice Warren first cited Mooney and 
Pyle for the “established” principle that due process prohibits 
“conviction[s] obtained through use of false evidence, known to be 
such by representatives of the State.”176 However, Chief Justice 
Warren had to argue further since the false testimony in Mooney and 
Pyle went directly to guilt or innocence, whereas the Napue false 
testimony only impeached witness credibility. Chief Justice Warren 
simply observed that the Mooney-Pyle principle “does not cease to 
apply merely because the false testimony goes only to the credibility 
of the witness.”177 Here, Chief Justice Warren flatly rejected a formal 
interpretation of prior precedent and effectively expanded the due 
process rule. 
This brings us to Brady’s brink. Since 1923, the Court had 
steadily expanded the scope of due process to prohibit mob-
dominated trials, subornation of perjury, and deliberate suppression 
of favorable evidence. These opinions all expressed substantive due 
process concern with the ends of justice and rejected a purely “notice 
and opportunity to be heard” procedural view. This expansion was 
backed by lax (in the case of Moore’s effective overruling of Frank) 
and then justificatory interpretations of stare decisis. However, all of 
the opinions in this line essentially dealt with situations in which 
state actors had proceeded in bad faith. Such bad-faith actions 
rendered formal procedural protections substantively impotent and 
led to injustice. Whether due process offered substantive protection 
for criminal defendants when bad faith was not implicated was not a 
question considered by the Court until Brady. 
 
 173. See Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 264 (1959). 
 174. Id. at 266–67. The witness had in fact received a plea deal for his cooperation. Id. 
 175. Id. at 272. 
 176. Id. at 269 (citing, inter alia, Mooney and Pyle). 
 177. Id. 
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C.  Brady: Contested Birth 
of a Discovery Right 
Though the Court did not do so, John Brady’s story could be 
read to reveal bad faith on the part of state authorities. Brady and his 
codefendant Donald Boblit faced charges for the robbery and murder 
by strangulation of William Brooks.178 Brady and Boblit each 
confessed participating in the crime to police but blamed the other 
for actually killing Brooks.179 The State tried the men separately and 
sought the death penalty for each. Prior to Brady’s trial, his counsel 
requested to view the records of Boblit’s confessions.180 Prosecutors 
withheld one confession in which Boblit admitted to strangling 
Brooks.181 At trial, Brady admitted his participation in the robbery 
but insisted that Boblit alone killed Brooks.182 On this basis, Brady’s 
counsel argued that his client should be spared capital punishment.183 
Without corroboration of Brady’s story, the jury returned a death 
sentence. When the State subsequently tried Boblit, Boblit attempted 
to pin the murder on Brady.184 At this point, prosecutors sought to 
impeach Boblit by brazenly introducing the very same confession 
they had previously withheld from Brady.185 The jury in Boblit’s trial 
found him guilty and sentenced him to die.186 
Years later, Brady learned of Boblit’s suppressed confession and 
filed a postconviction appeal.187 After the trial court denied relief, the 
Maryland Court of Appeals reversed and ordered a new punishment-
phase trial for Brady.188 In its opinion, the court found that the State 
“knew in advance” of Brady’s trial strategy and that “there was a 
duty on the State to produce the confession of Boblit that he did the 
actual strangling or at least to inform counsel for the accused of its 
 
 178. See Brady v. State, 160 A.2d 912, 913–14 (Md. 1960). 
 179. See Brady v. State, 154 A.2d 434, 434–35 (Md. 1959). 
 180. Stephanos Bibas, Brady v. Maryland: From Adversarial Gamesmanship Toward the 
Search for Innocence?, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 129, 134 (Carol S. Steiker ed., 2006) 
(citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 84 (1963)). 
 181. Brady v. State, 174 A.2d 167, 169 (Md. 1961). 
 182. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 84 (1963). 
 183. Id. 
 184. Brady, 154 A.2d at 435. 
 185. Brady, 174 A.2d at 169. However, since this confession was not signed by Boblit, the 
presiding judge did not admit it into evidence. Id. 
 186. Brady, 154 A.2d at 434. 
 187. See Bibas, supra note 180, at 134. 
 188. See Brady, 174 A.2d at 172. 
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existence.”189 In language closely anticipating the eventual Brady 
Rule, the court then stated: “the suppression or withholding by the 
State, of material evidence exculpatory to an accused is a violation of 
due process . . . . It is none the less a denial of due process if the 
withholding of material evidence is without guile.”190 
The Maryland court’s suggestion that prosecutors suppressed 
evidence “without guile” is puzzling. Consider the following 
proposition: Boblit strangled Brooks. At Brady’s trial, the 
prosecution did not want the jury to believe this proposition and so 
withheld evidence supporting it. At Boblit’s trial, the prosecution 
now wanted the jury to believe the exact same proposition and so 
sought to prove it using the evidence it had previously withheld. 
Through suppression and incompatible positions about the identity of 
the true killer, the prosecution sent two men to the gallows. One 
might well ask—how is this not bad faith? In the end, the Court 
never confronted this question since the parties did not dispute it.191 
Brady made no bad-faith accusations and prosecutors certainly did 
not advance a good-faith defense.192 This lack of debate helps 
initially explain how the Court’s arguably radical extension of 
Mooney’s bad-faith principle to good-faith situations escaped direct 
comment. 
In any event, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of 
Appeals.193 In his majority opinion, Justice Douglas wrote for six 
members of the Court and proclaimed that the court below had 
“state[d] the correct constitutional rule.”194 Justice Douglas then 
frankly stated: “This ruling is an extension of Mooney.”195 Next, 
 
 189. Id. at 169. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Two potential good-faith explanations are possible—though weak. First, admissibility 
issues surrounding Boblit’s confession possibly led prosecutors to believe disclosure to the 
defense was pointless. See Brady, 174 A.2d at 170. Alternatively, prosecutors may have believed 
that both Boblit and Brady shared complete culpability for the murder and so employed cynical 
tactics to reach a result they thought just—the death penalty for both. 
 192. See generally Brief for Petitioner, Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (No. 490), 
1962 WL 115267 [hereinafter Brady Petitioner’s Brief] (stating no bad-faith accusations against 
prosecutors). And for its part, the State did not try to defend its actions as undertaken in good 
faith. See generally Brief for Respondent, Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (No. 490), 
1963 WL 105617 [hereinafter Brady Respondent’s Brief] (offering no defense on the part of the 
State that actions were taken in good faith). 
 193. Brady, 373 U.S. at 91. 
 194. Id. at 86. 
 195. Id. (emphasis added). 
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Justice Douglas recounted developments since Mooney, noting both 
how courts had interpreted Pyle to forbid “‘suppression of evidence 
favorable’ to the accused”196 and how Napue itself had “extended the 
test formulated in Mooney” to prohibit the state from allowing false 
evidence to go uncorrected.197 With this pattern of extending 
precedent established, Justice Douglas formally announced the now-
familiar Brady Rule. To recall it once more, this Rule held that 
suppression of favorable evidence by the prosecution when requested 
by the defense violated due process, “irrespective of the good faith or 
bad faith of the prosecution.”198 
The highly justificatory thrust of Justice Douglas’s approach to 
stare decisis is apparent. Certainly, his assertion that the Brady Rule 
was a simple “extension of Mooney” is vulnerable to formal charges 
of impermissibly expanding then-existing due process jurisprudence. 
After all, it is quite a leap to infer an affirmative duty to disclose 
exculpatory evidence from cases that imposed a negative prohibition 
on suborning perjury or allowing lies to stand uncorrected. It 
similarly stretches analogy to find a constitutional basis for 
regulating discovery in cases that erected due process protections 
against mob justice. In short, it is a radical move to find precedent 
for the irrespective-of-good-or-bad-faith command of Brady in the 
tied-to-bad-faith history of its ancestral cases. 
Although Justice Douglas’s radical move was indeed contested, 
this specific stare decisis critique was not raised. On the key due 
process issue, Justice Byron White’s separate concurring opinion 
functioned as the dissent.199 Justice White railed against the central 
innovation of Brady—“cast[ing] in constitutional form a broad rule 
of criminal discovery.”200 He advocated leaving the task of creating 
discovery rules “to the rule-making or legislative process after full 
consideration by legislators, bench, and bar.”201 As noted, Justice 
White did not back his argument by accusing the Court of 
 
 196. Id. at 87 (quoting United States ex rel. Almeida v. Baldi, 195 F.2d 815, 820 (3d Cir. 
1952)). 
 197. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959)). 
 198. Id. 
 199. Justice White concurred in the judgment on the only live controversy—whether John 
Brady deserved a new innocence-phase trial. He agreed that Brady did not. Id. at 92 (White, J., 
concurring). 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
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improperly stretching prior precedent. However, he did attempt to 
stifle Brady’s doctrinal influence through a different kind of formal 
stare decisis argument. Specifically, Justice White boldly argued that 
the Brady Rule was nonbinding dictum.202 
Justice White’s formal reasoning proceeded from the 
observation that the Maryland Court of Appeals opinion—which was 
affirmed by the Court in Brady—had invoked due process without 
explicitly citing either the Maryland or federal constitutions.203 Since 
both constitutions had due process clauses, Justice White noted that 
it was impossible to know whether the lower court’s due process 
language stated a proposition of state or federal law, which rendered 
“the [federal] due process discussion by the Court . . . wholly 
advisory.”204 On this formal reading, the now-famous Brady Rule 
had no precedential value.205 Though it seems quixotic in light of 
actual doctrinal developments, it is worth noting that Justice White’s 
argument was formally reasonable. Indeed, Justice Douglas’s due 
process discussion was not logically necessary to affirm the lower 
court, and, under a formal view of precedent, only those statements 
that are logically necessary to a court’s decision constitute its 
holding.206 
Of course, one reason that Justice White’s formal stare decisis 
reasoning did not prevail is that it patently ignored Justice Douglas’s 
unequivocal “[w]e now hold” prefatory language. Another reason is 
that his formal critique had little persuasive traction at that stage of 
the doctrinal discourse. In the forty years prior to Brady, the Court 
had steadily expanded due process and rejected formal readings of 
precedent.207 Brady unquestionably represented an even more radical 
leap forward, but it had momentum behind it. As with Justice 
Holmes’s aggressive expansion of due process in Moore, it is 
unsurprising that Justice Douglas paid little heed to formal stare 
 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. at 91. 
 204. Id. at 92. 
 205. In his separate dissent, Justice Harlan agreed with Justice White that there was “no 
necessity for deciding in this case the broad due process questions with which the Court deals.” 
Id. at 92 n.1 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 206. See Dorf, supra note 24, at 2041 (quoting Rupert Cross & J.W. Harris, PRECEDENT IN 
ENGLISH LAW 72 (4th ed. 1991) (“The ratio decidendi of a case is any rule of law expressly or 
impliedly treated by the judge as a necessary step in reaching his conclusion . . . .”). 
 207. See supra Part III.A–B. 
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decisis in Brady. After all, Justice Douglas had written a law review 
article fourteen years earlier in which he proclaimed that stare decisis 
had only a “tenuous” place in constitutional law.208 “So far as 
constitutional law is concerned,” wrote the future author of Brady, 
“stare decisis must give way before the dynamic component of 
history.”209 
Ultimately, this “dynamic component of history” is what 
justified Justice Douglas’s radical doctrinal move in Brady and 
shielded it from any frontal attack on its precedential legitimacy. As I 
see it, the explanation for the comparatively muted critique of Brady, 
despite the opinion’s tenuous link to prior precedent, lies in shifting 
historical paradigms of criminal prosecution and in the 
fundamentally intuitive appeal of the Brady Rule. 
From the time of the Founding through the mid-twentieth 
century, criminal trials were deeply adversarial affairs.210 In theory, 
juries found truth by weighing the competing cases advanced by the 
prosecution and defense. Each side sought victory in a sporting 
contest whose fairness was guaranteed by judges enforcing neutral 
rules. This early paradigm is known as the sporting theory of justice. 
By the time of Mooney, support for the sporting paradigm was 
waning but still had its adherents. In his Mooney brief, the California 
Attorney General unabashedly stated that the “function of the 
prosecuting attorney is to prosecute, to act as an accuser, to be a 
partisan, to present the evidence on one side of the case.”211 Due 
process, he reasoned, only demanded an “impartial [court] between 
the accuser and the accused” and could never be violated by a 
conviction obtained through perjury unless “the trial judge or trial 
jurors were parties to the alleged fraud.”212 Under the sporting 
paradigm, this was a credible argument. Yet the Mooney Court 
implicitly rejected this “narrow view of the requirement of due 
 
 208. William O. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 735, 736 (1949). 
 209. Id. at 737. 
 210. See Bibas, supra note 180, at 131 (citing John H. Langbein, THE ORIGINS OF 
ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL (2003)). 
 211. See Mooney AG’s Brief, supra note 162, at 20. 
 212. Id. at 21. 
  
126 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:77 
 
process.”213 In Brady, Justice Douglas finally and explicitly rejected 
the “sporting theory of justice.”214 
Under the new paradigm, the prosecution’s ethical obligation 
became seeking justice rather than victory. With a new paradigm 
came new intuitions. By 1963, mandating the disclosure of 
exculpatory evidence gained an intuitive appeal that it lacked at the 
time of the Founding and passage of the Fourteenth Amendment. In 
Brady itself, everyone on all sides accepted that Boblit’s confession 
should not have been withheld.215 The new intuition signaled that 
what it meant to “play by the rules” in American criminal 
prosecutions had forever changed. The fundamental proposition that 
the prosecution had some duty to disclose evidence of innocence 
made sense. Because of this, limiting due process to the formal rules 
already in place made less sense. Advancing the reasoning of 
Mooney mattered more than fidelity to its formal rule. 
However, the emergence of a new paradigm did not spell the 
end of the dialectic between substantive and procedural due process 
schools. In many ways, Justice Douglas’s Brady opinion represents 
the apogee of the substantive school’s influence over freestanding 
criminal due process doctrine. While no dissenting opinions 
questioned the doctrinal expansions in Mooney, Pyle, and Napue, 
Justice White did argue against constitutionalizing discovery in 
Brady. In his opinion, Justice White rested his objection on 
pragmatic grounds rather than previous doctrine. However, I suggest 
that his argument effectively picked up procedural due process 
themes previously championed by Justices Matthews in Hurtado, 
Pitney in Frank, and McReynolds in Moore. For this reason, Figure 1 
connects Justice White’s opinion to those earlier procedural opinions 
with a dotted arrow. Justice White’s basic stance in Brady expressed 
both a confidence in the integrity of state-court criminal processes 
and misgivings at federal-court intervention in those processes. This 
stance resonates with the earlier procedural due process tradition. 
 
 213. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935). 
 214. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 90–91 (1963); see also United States v. Agurs, 427 
U.S. 97, 108 n.15 (1976) (quoting Brady’s rejection of the “sporting theory of justice”). 
 215. This benefited John Brady. After the Supreme Court handed down its decision, 
prosecutors never sought another death sentence for Brady and he was quietly paroled from 
prison eighteen years later. See Bibas, supra note 180, at 137. 
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The next Part explores how the substance/procedure dialectic 
unfolded after Brady. Even though Justice White’s particular stare 
decisis objections to Brady failed, his procedural critique gained 
traction as objections mounted to recognizing too broad a 
constitutional right to discovery. As the desire to halt expansion 
spread, we see the re-emergence of more formal stare decisis 
argumentation in due process doctrine. 
IV.  DEFINING THE FRONTIER: 
BRADY BATTLES 1963–2012 
Does Brady guarantee fair process or substantive justice? Justice 
Douglas’s original Brady opinion cited both concerns when 
explaining the principle behind the new Rule: 
The principle . . . is not punishment of society for 
misdeeds of a prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair trial to 
the accused. Society wins not only when the guilty are 
convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our system of 
the administration of justice suffers when any accused is 
treated unfairly. An inscription on the walls of the 
Department of Justice states the proposition candidly for the 
federal domain: “The United States wins its point whenever 
justice is done its citizens in the courts.”216 
This passage suggests twin justifications for the Brady Rule. The 
first justification is fairness. This is a procedural justification, 
grounding the Brady Rule in a constitutional commitment to fair 
administration of justice irrespective of an accused’s guilt or 
innocence. The second justification is justice. This concern 
transcends procedural fairness and finds backing for the Rule in 
substantively just results. Under this second justification, Brady 
stands for a constitutional commitment to protecting innocence and 
apprehending the guilty. 
This Part surveys the post-Brady battles over the scope and 
application of the Brady Rule. These battles contested which of 
Brady’s twin justifications should dominate understanding of the due 
process doctrine. While the substantive school pushed for a broad 
discovery right, the procedural school sought to limit the 
 
 216. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. 
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prosecutorial duty to disclose. Unsurprisingly, the substantive school 
backed its doctrinal arguments by appealing to Brady’s substantive 
justification as a guarantee of justice. Likewise, the procedural 
school backed its arguments by characterizing Brady as a limited 
procedural mechanism for ensuring fairness at trial. 
The nearly five decades of debate since Brady divide into two 
basic eras. Part IV.A explores the first era, which extends from 1963 
until the Court handed down United States v. Bagley in 1985. During 
this era, the primary focus was on the reach of Brady’s central 
materiality requirement. As shown, Bagley represented a major 
victory for the procedural school, one that was enacted through a 
highly formal stare decisis argumentation. 
In the post-Bagley years, stare decisis concerns took a backseat 
in the mainline dialectic as battles over Brady’s legal meaning 
largely gave way to disputes over the application of facts. Part IV.B 
explores the period after Bagley until the present day. Although the 
procedural view of Brady is now dominant, this subpart shows how 
Brady has become so entrenched in due process doctrine that it may 
rightly be called “super-precedent.” 
A.  Debating Materiality: 
Brady to Bagley 1963–1985 
After Brady, the competing schools primarily debated the scope 
of due process discovery and whether prosecutorial suppression 
could ever be deemed constitutionally harmless. These debates 
largely turned on interpretations of Brady’s materiality requirement. 
The subpart shows how the procedural tradition eventually 
consolidated its hold over the doctrine in Bagley. 
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Giglio v. United States (Chief Justice Warren Burger for the Court, 
1972);219 United States v. Agurs (Justice Thurgood Marshall 
dissenting, 1976);220 and United States v. Bagley (Justice Marshall 
dissenting, 1985).221 
Once again, the red line represents the competing procedural 
school. The opinions all denied due process relief to the defendant 
(or, if written in dissent, would not have afforded due process relief). 
In chronological order, the opinions in this line are Brady (Justice 
White concurring, 1963); Giles (Justice John Marshall Harlan II 
dissenting, 1967); Moore v. Illinois (Justice Harry Blackmun for the 
Court, 1972);222 Agurs (Justice John Paul Stevens for the Court, 
1976); and Bagley (Justice Blackmun for the Court, 1985).223 
Since it is technically not part of the Brady line, Strickland v. 
Washington (Justice Sandra Day O’Connor for the Court, 1984)224 is 
 
by Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justice Douglas. Id. at 67. Justice White concurred in judgment 
and wrote an opinion. Id. at 82 (White, J., concurring). Justice Abe Fortas did the same. Id. at 96 
(Fortas, J., concurring). Justice John Marshall Harlan II dissented in an opinion joined by Justices 
Hugo Black, Tom Clark, and Potter Stewart. Id. at 102 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 219. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). Giglio was a 7–0 decision. Chief Justice 
Warren Burger delivered the opinion of the Court. Id. Justices Lewis Powell and William 
Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or the decision of the case. Id. at 155. 
 220. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 114 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Agurs was a 
7–2 decision. Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. Id. at 98. Justice 
Thurgood Marshall dissented in an opinion joined by Justice Brennan. Id. at 114 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). 
 221. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 685 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Bagley was 
a 5–3 decision. Justice Blackmun announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion 
of the Court except for Part III. Id. at 669. Justice O’Connor joined Justice Blackmun in Part III. 
Id. at 668. Justice White joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist concurred except 
for Part III. Id. at 685 (White, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Justice Marshall 
dissented in an opinion joined by Justice Brennan. Id. at 685 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice 
John Paul Stevens filed a solo dissenting opinion. Id. at 709. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice 
Lewis Powell took no part in the decision of the case. Id. at 684. 
 222. Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786 (1972). Moore was a 5–4 decision. Justice Harry 
Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. Id. at 787. Justice Marshall concurred in part and 
dissented in part and was joined by Justices Douglas, Stewart, and Powell. Id. at 800 (Marshall, 
J., dissenting). 
 223. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 668 (opinion of Blackmun, J.). Since Justice Blackmun advanced the 
critical due process proposition regarding materiality under Brady in Part III of his opinion, 
technically this triangle should be represented as only getting two votes. However, this would be 
misleading, since three other justices explicitly endorsed his materiality test. See id. at 685 
(White, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 
 224. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Strickland was an 8–1 decision. Justice 
Sandra Day O’Connor delivered the opinion of the Court. Id. at 671. Justice William J. Brennan 
joined the Court’s opinion but dissented in judgment based on his view that the death penalty is 
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represented as an orange circle. As explained below, Strickland did 
play an important “borrowing role” in restricting the meaning of 
Brady materiality.225 
The post-Brady dialectic began with Giles. It provides an apt 
starting point since the exchange between Justice Fortas and Justice 
Harlan provides a blueprint for a debate that has continued for 
decades. Decided in 1967, the case concerned the rape convictions of 
brothers James and John Giles.226 At trial, the Giles brothers offered 
a consent defense and argued that the victim had fabricated her rape 
allegations.227 Prosecutors suppressed information affecting the 
victim’s credibility before trial.228 After their conviction, the brothers 
sought Brady relief.229 The Court ultimately sent the case back to 
state court to consider new evidence disclosed for the first time 
during the Supreme Court litigation.230 Justice Brennan wrote the 
plurality opinion in which he declined to examine potential issues 
about the scope of the prosecution’s constitutional duty to 
disclose.231 
Where Justice Brennan ducked the question, Justices Harlan and 
Fortas pointedly sparred over Brady. Justice Fortas initiated the 
argument in his concurring opinion. Confronting the objection that 
the suppressed revelations about the victim may not have been 
admissible at the Giles’ trial, Justice Fortas wrote: 
I do not agree that the State may be excused from its 
duty to disclose material facts known to it prior to trial 
solely because of a conclusion that they would not be 
admissible at trial. The State’s obligation is not to convict, 
but to see that, so far as possible, truth emerges. This is also 
 
cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 701 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
Justice Marshall filed a solo dissenting opinion. Id. at 706 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 225. See infra notes 287–291 and accompanying text. 
 226. Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 67 (1967) (plurality opinion). 
 227. Id. at 69–70. 
 228. Specifically, prosecutors suppressed information showing that after the alleged rape 
occurred, but before the Giles’ trial, the same victim had suffered from emotional disturbance, 
attempted suicide, and accused two other men of rape and then dropped the charges. Id. at 72–73. 
 229. The brothers prevailed in state trial court but lost on state appeal. See id. at 68; State v. 
Giles, 212 A. 2d 101, 111 (Md. Ct. App. 1965). 
 230. See Giles, 386 U.S. at 74 (“We now have evidence before us, which neither Judge 
Moorman nor the Court of Appeals considered, which in our view justifies a remand to the Court 
of Appeals for its consideration . . . .”). 
 231. Id. at 73–74. 
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the ultimate statement of its responsibility to provide a fair 
trial under the Due Process Clause . . . . No respectable 
interest of the State is served by its concealment of 
information which is material, generously conceived, to the 
case, including all possible defenses.232 
By positing the search for truth as “the ultimate statement” of 
the due process obligation, Justice Fortas grounded the Brady Rule in 
a commitment to substantive justice.233 By calling for a generous 
conception of materiality, he also advocated a justificatory approach 
to interpreting Brady’s precedent.234 
In dissent, Justice Harlan mounted a rear-guard attack on Brady. 
Justice Harlan first characterized Justice Fortas’s “generously 
conceived” materiality standard as a marked departure from the 
formal due process tradition of Mooney and Napue.235 Since Justice 
Fortas’s materiality standard implicitly invoked Brady, Justice 
Harlan explicitly dismissed the Brady Rule as “dicta” and cited 
Justice White’s Brady concurrence as authority for this 
proposition.236 Going further, Justice Harlan then proposed the 
Mooney-Napue rules against suborning perjury or permitting false 
testimony to go uncorrected as the outer limit of prosecutorial due 
process obligations.237 Justice Harlan warned that Justice Fortas’s 
reading of Brady would result “in the imposition upon the States 
through the Constitution of broad discovery rules,” and that “[t]hose 
rules would entirely alter the character and balance of our present 
systems of criminal justice.”238 Under Justice Harlan’s view, 
discovery regulation was simply beyond the scope of legitimate due 
process precedent. His argument thus adopted a formal stare decisis 
stance. 
 
 232. Id. at 98 (Fortas, J., concurring). 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. at 96–102. 
 235. Id. at 116 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“This standard would demand markedly broader 
disclosures than this Court has ever held the Fourteenth Amendment to require.”). 
 236. Id. at 116–17 n.9 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“I cannot agree that this Court in Brady 
extended Mooney in any fashion.” (quoting Brady v. Maryland 373 U.S. 83, 92 (1963) (White, J., 
concurring))). 
 237. Id. at 117 (“Nor, in my view, does the Constitution demand more” (discussing Mooney 
and Napue)). 
 238. Id. 
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As it turns out, Justice Harlan’s dissent in Giles was the last 
Supreme Court opinion that ever characterized the Brady Rule as 
dictum. Yet in subsequent battles over the Rule’s scope, Justice 
Harlan’s Giles opinion continued to exert influence over the 
procedural school. As shown in Figure 2, Justice Blackmun’s Bagley 
opinion cited back to Justice Harlan’s Giles dissent—just as Justice 
Harlan had cited back to Justice White’s Brady concurrence.239 Even 
though Brady became accepted as legitimate precedent, Justice 
Harlan’s warning that broad discovery rules would undermine 
prosecutors’ adversarial role inspired the procedural school to limit 
Brady. What’s more, adherents to the procedural school followed 
Justice Harlan in using formal appeals to stare decisis.240 
After Giles, though, the substantive school arguably still 
commanded the doctrine. However, 1972’s Giglio represents the last 
unequivocal victory for that school. John Giglio’s conviction 
stemmed from federal forgery charges.241 At trial, an informant 
testified against Giglio and denied under vigorous cross-examination 
that he had an immunity deal.242 The prosecution knew his testimony 
was false.243 This was classic uncorrected perjury, and the Court 
unanimously held for Giglio.244 Chief Justice Burger’s opinion made 
clear that nondisclosure of evidence affecting credibility fell under 
the Brady Rule.245 Since the informant’s credibility was potentially 
“determinative of [Giglio’s] guilt or innocence,” reversal of the 
conviction was necessary to comport with the “rudimentary demands 
of justice.”246 In granting relief for the defendant, Giglio thus 
emphasized substantive justice and a systemic commitment to truth. 
Where Giglio lacked controversy, Moore provoked it. 
Coincidentally, the 1972 Moore case saw the procedural school 
notch its first significant victory since the substantive school 
 
 239. Justice Blackmun’s majority opinion in Moore also implicitly adopted Justice Harlan’s 
procedural reasoning. See infra note 293 and accompanying text. 
 240. See infra note 250 and accompanying text. 
 241. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 150 (1972). 
 242. Id. at 151–52. 
 243. Id. at 152–53. 
 244. Although there were no dissenters, two Justices did not participate in the case. See supra 
note 219. Thus, Figure 2 shows Justice Burger’s opinion as getting seven votes. 
 245. Giglio, 405 U.S. at 153–54 (discussing Brady and finding that Brady’s materiality 
requirement applied in the case). 
 246. Id. at 153 (quoting Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935)). 
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assumed majority control in the 1923 Moore case. The facts were 
simple enough. Lyman Moore stood convicted of a barroom-
shooting murder, and evidence emerged posttrial that cast doubt on 
an eyewitness who pegged Moore as the shooter.247 Writing for a 
five-Justice majority, Justice Blackmun concluded that the 
suppressed evidence was not “material” under Brady.248 Though 
Justice Blackmun professed to “adhere to the principles of Brady,” 
he also emphasized that there is “no constitutional requirement that 
the prosecution make a complete and detailed accounting to the 
defense of all police investigatory work on a case.”249 Here, Justice 
Blackmun implicitly followed the position Justice Harlan urged in 
his Giles dissent—emphasizing constitutional limits on prosecutors’ 
discovery obligations and denying Brady relief.250 
Just as Justice Blackmun made his debut for the procedural 
school, Moore saw Justice Thurgood Marshall enter the Brady fray 
for the first time in the dissent.251 Although the two Justices would 
later clash mightily with their interpretations of Brady’s precedent in 
Bagley, their Moore debate requires little attention since both 
opinions focused on facts rather than law. The opinions reached 
opposite conclusions about the materiality of the suppressed 
evidence in Moore, but neither jurist articulated a clear standard for 
this vital term.252 The real significance of their exchange is that it 
made clear that Brady battles could turn on the meaning of 
 
 247. Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 788–793 (1972). 
 248. Id. at 797–98. Moore won some relief since his case was decided on the same day as 
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), which famously held the death penalty 
unconstitutional. Id. Since Moore had been sentenced to death, the Court also ruled that his death 
sentence could not be imposed. See Moore, 408 U.S. at 800. 
 249. Moore, 408 U.S. at 798, 795. 
 250. Because the connection is implicit, the arrow connecting the opinions in Figure 2 is 
dotted. Of course, I recognize that Justice Blackmun in Moore departed from Justice Harlan’s 
strict position that the Brady Rule was dictum. At the same time, the deeper hermeneutic 
connection between the two jurists is evident from Justice Blackmun’s subsequent citation in 
Bagley to Justice Harlan’s Giles dissent for the proposition that Brady represents a limited 
procedural departure from an otherwise adversarial system. See infra notes 293–294. 
 251. See Moore, 408 U.S. at 800–08 (Marshall, J., dissenting). It is on account of its relative 
poverty as a source for legal analysis that I do not include Justice Marshall’s Moore dissent in 
Figure 2. 
 252. Compare Moore, 408 U.S. at 797 (“We conclude, in light of all the evidence, that 
Sanders’ misidentification of Moore as Slick was not material to the issue of guilt.”), with id. at 
806 n.4 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“The materiality of the undisclosed evidence in this case cannot 
be seriously doubted.”). 
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“materiality.” How to define materiality would in turn depend on 
competing understandings of Brady’s justification and the proper 
approach to stare decisis. The fight over materiality ultimately played 
out over two key cases—Agurs in 1976 and Bagley in 1985. 
Justice Stevens’s majority opinion in Agurs uncomfortably 
occupies a liminal space between substantive and procedural due 
process conceptions of Brady. This is because the opinion 
simultaneously expanded and contracted the Brady Rule’s scope.253 
The story behind this doctrinal ambiguity begins with a tryst in a 
cheap motel.254 After hearing screams, motel employees barged into 
the room of erstwhile lovers James Sewell and Linda Agurs who 
were struggling over a bowie knife. After Sewell died from stab 
wounds, Agurs faced murder charges.255 At trial, Agurs asserted self-
defense to no avail.256 Months after her conviction, Agurs’s counsel 
discovered that Sewell had twice pleaded guilty to assault with a 
deadly weapon—a knife.257 Agurs sought Brady relief, and the case 
found its way to the Court, which granted certiorari to decide 
“whether the prosecutor ha[d] any constitutional duty to volunteer 
exculpatory matter to the defense, and if so, what standard of 
materiality gives rise to that duty.”258 
The government pointed out to the Court that Agurs had never 
requested Sewell’s criminal record and argued that, therefore, no 
Brady duty to disclose had existed.259 This was a formal argument 
based on the Brady Rule’s “upon request” condition—language the 
government insisted should be read literally.260 Writing for a seven-
Justice majority, Justice Stevens rejected this formal argument 
without ever directly addressing it. Instead, Justice Stevens 
proclaimed that an affirmative duty to disclose existed in situations 
 
 253. Since the majority denied relief to the criminal defendant, its representative triangle in 
Figure 2 is red and points down. Conversely, Figure 2 represents Justice Marshall’s dissent in 
Agurs with a blue upward-pointing triangle because Justice Marshall would have granted relied 
under his unambiguously substantive perspective. 
 254. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 98 (1976). 
 255. Id. at 99–100. 
 256. Id. at 100. 
 257. Id. at 100–01. 
 258. Id. at 107. 
 259. Id. at 101. 
 260. See Brief for the United States, United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976) (No. 75-491), 
1976 WL 181371 at *24–26. In its argument, the government identified additional phrases in 
Brady and Moore that indicated that the defense had to request evidence. Id. 
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in which the “evidence is obviously of such substantial value to the 
defense that elementary fairness requires it to be disclosed even 
without a specific request.”261 To back this proposition, Justice 
Stevens invoked classic substantive due process justifications for 
Brady including the sovereign’s interest in protecting innocence and 
seeing that “justice shall be done.”262 In sum, Justice Stevens 
ostensibly expanded the scope of the Brady Rule using a justificatory 
approach to stare decisis grounded in a substantive conception of due 
process. 
Yet the outcome in Agurs belies any conclusion that the case 
represents a victory for the substantive school. Justice Stevens denied 
relief to Linda Agurs based on a narrow new materiality test.263 To 
be fair, Justice Stevens’s opinion actually suggested that Brady had 
three different materiality tests. The first two tests covered Mooney-
like situations where suppressed evidence reveals knowing use of 
perjured testimony and Brady-like situations where suppression 
occurred despite a specific defense request for evidence.264 Only the 
third test covered no-request situations like the one presented by 
Agurs’s case.265 Here Justice Stevens said that suppressed evidence 
was material only “if the omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt 
that did not otherwise exist” when “evaluated in the context of the 
entire record.”266 According to Justice Stevens, this test struck a 
delicate balance by being less demanding on defendants than 
traditional newly-discovered-evidence tests but more demanding 
than customary harmless-error review.267 
Yet Justice Stevens’s claims to balance were undermined by the 
test’s stated goal of protecting prosecutors. Justice Stevens explicitly 
set the materiality bar high enough to insulate prosecutors from 
 
 261. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 110. 
 262. Id. at 110–11 (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)). 
 263. See id. at 112–14. 
 264. Id. at 103–04. 
 265. Id. at 106–07. 
 266. Id. at 112. 
 267. The stricter newly-discovered-evidence standard required defendants to show that “the 
newly discovered evidence probably would have resulted in acquittal.” Id. at 111 & n.19. By 
contrast, under harmless-error review, once constitutional error is found, the reviewing judge 
must set aside the verdict unless his “conviction is sure that the error did not influence the jury, or 
had but very slight effect.” Id. at 112 (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764 
(1946) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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having to deliver their entire files to defense counsel.268 This shows 
the influence of the procedural due process school. Indeed, Justice 
Stevens tellingly cited Justice Blackmun’s Moore opinion and call to 
limit procedural obligations when he justified this new materiality 
test.269 And of course, the result in Agurs seemed to show that the 
new test tipped the scales in favor of prosecutors. Under the test, 
Justice Stevens found that nondisclosure of Sewell’s previous knife 
assault charges did not create a reasonable doubt that did not 
otherwise exist. Despite the clear relevance of the knife charges to 
Agurs’s self-defense theory, Justice Stevens’s opinion forgave the 
nondisclosure and thus hinted that the obligation to disclose may 
never have existed.270 
Justice Marshall dissented and sharply criticized the Court’s 
attempted balancing act. Though it properly recognized an 
affirmative duty to disclose, Justice Marshall argued, “the Court so 
narrowly defines the category of ‘material’ evidence embraced by 
the duty as to deprive it of all meaningful content.”271 Justice 
Marshall insisted that the majority’s new rule undermined Brady’s 
substantive commitments. The rule was “completely at odds with the 
overriding interest in assuring that evidence tending to show 
innocence is brought to the jury’s attention.”272 This was because 
[t]he rule creates little, if any, incentive for the prosecutor 
conscientiously to determine whether his files contain 
evidence helpful to the defense. Indeed, the rule reinforces 
the natural tendency of the prosecutor to overlook evidence 
favorable to the defense, and creates an incentive for the 
prosecutor to resolve close questions of disclosure in favor 
of concealment.273 
Rather than accepting the Court’s “harsh standard,” Justice 
Marshall advocated a test that required vacatur “[i]f there is a 
significant chance that the withheld evidence, developed by skilled 
counsel, would have induced a reasonable doubt in the minds of 
 
 268. Id. at 111. 
 269. Id. at 109 (quoting Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 795 (1972)). 
 270. See id. at 114. 
 271. Id. at 114 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 272. Id. at 117. 
 273. Id. 
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enough jurors to avoid a conviction.”274 This alternate test, Justice 
Marshall reasoned, would properly permit “close” cases to go to a 
jury—the rightful finders of fact in criminal cases.275 To back his 
argument in favor of an expansive Brady right, Justice Marshall cited 
Justice Fortas’s Giles concurrence, the inspiration for the substantive 
due process school.276 
In retrospect, Justice Stevens likely regretted his failure to hear 
Justice Marshall’s critique in Agurs. Though Justice Stevens 
apparently intended it, his Agurs opinion did not plainly announce 
itself as an expansion of Brady in the upfront manner that Brady had 
announced itself as an extension of Mooney.277 Instead, Justice 
Stevens’s opinion waivered in emphasis between substantive and 
procedural conceptions of Brady and expressed a general concern 
with constitutionalizing discovery. This left a rhetorical flank open, 
which the procedural Brady school successfully attacked in 1985’s 
United States v. Bagley. After decades of expansion driven by 
concern for substantive justice, Bagley saw the school that 
interpreted Brady as a purely procedural guarantee firmly seize 
control of the doctrine and start to contract the due process 
territory.278 
Justice Blackmun authored the procedural school’s winning 
Bagley opinion and relied upon a peculiarly formal approach to stare 
decisis. To understand his opinion, it is important to realize that 
Hugh Bagley’s case involved a specific request for Brady material 
that went ignored by the prosecution.279 In particular, Bagley had 
requested records of government deals with informants who testified 
 
 274. Id. at 119. Justice Marshall took this standard from “the prevailing view in the federal 
courts.” Id. at 118–19 & n.5. In particular, Justice Marshall seemed taken by Judge Friendly’s 
analysis about the correct standard. See id. at 119 n.6. 
 275. See id. at 118–19. 
 276. See id. at 120 (discussing Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 100 (1967) (Fortas, J., 
concurring)). 
 277. Justice Stevens expressed his intent in his Bagley dissent. See infra note 296 and 
accompanying text. 
 278. Though they have not employed my terms, scholars agree that Bagley heralded a turning 
point. See, e.g., Eugene Cerruti, Through the Looking-Glass at the Brady Doctrine: Some New 
Reflections on White Queens, Hobgoblins, and Due Process, 94 KY. L.J. 211, 239 (2005); David 
Rudovsky, Running in Place: The Paradox of Expanding Rights and Restricted Remedies, 2005 
U. ILL. L. REV. 1199, 1224 & n.288 (2005). 
 279. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 669–70 (1985). 
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against him in a federal “drugs and guns” prosecution.280 Pretrial, the 
government claimed no deals existed, but postconviction 
investigations revealed that the informants had been paid.281 The key 
legal question before the Court was how to interpret Brady’s 
materiality requirement.282 In Bagley, six justices endorsed the now 
governing materiality test—“evidence is material only if there is a 
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different”—and reversed 
Bagley’s victory below.283 
Adopting a single test for materiality in Brady necessarily meant 
jettisoning Agurs’s three-tiered materiality framework. In his opinion 
for the Court, Justice Blackmun acknowledged Agurs’s three-tiered 
analysis but concluded that Agurs’s no-request standard was 
“sufficiently flexible to cover the ‘no request,’ ‘general request,’ and 
‘specific request’ cases” of prosecutorial suppression.284 Justice 
Blackmun thus summarily collapsed Agurs’s differentiated 
materiality tests into a single test.285 Crucially, Justice Blackmun 
offered no independent stare decisis analysis for this move. He did 
not criticize the Agurs’s framework as incorrect, illogical, or 
unworkable. Instead, Justice Blackmun reasoned from a simple 
premise concerning recent Court precedent that cited Agurs:  
[T]he Court has relied on and reformulated the Agurs 
standard for the materiality of undisclosed evidence in two 
subsequent cases arising outside the Brady context. In 
neither case did the Court’s discussion of the Agurs 
 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id. at 671–72. 
 282. The Ninth Circuit had actually granted relief to Bagley on a combined 
Brady/Confrontation Clause theory. See Bagley v. Lumpkin, 719 F.2d 1462, 1464 (9th Cir. 1983). 
However, the Court quickly rejected the relevance of the confrontation argument and this aspect 
of the Court’s decision provoked no dissent. See Bagley, 473 U.S at 676–77. 
 283. See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 684 (White, J., concurring in part). Since the Ninth Circuit 
had decided the case on inapposite grounds, see supra note 282, the Court remanded Bagley’s 
case back to the Ninth Circuit to determine “whether there is a reasonable probability that, had the 
inducement offered by the Government to O’Connor and Mitchell been disclosed to the defense, 
the result of the trial would have been different.” Bagley, 473 U.S. at 684. 
 284. Id. at 682 (opinion of Blackmun, J.); see also id. at 685 (White, J., concurring in part) 
(agreeing that the standard is “sufficiently flexible”). 
 285. More precisely, Bagley collapsed the “no request” and “specific request” materiality 
standards and left the standard for the first Agurs situation (regarding perjury) untouched. See 
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433 (1995) (noting that Bagley “abandoned the distinction 
between the second and third Agurs circumstances . . . .”). 
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standard distinguish among the three situations described in 
Agurs.286 
After briefly quoting the two cases (United States v. Valenzuela-
Bernal287 and Strickland v. Washington), Justice Blackmun 
concluded that “the Strickland formulation of the Agurs test for 
materiality [is] sufficiently flexible [enough] to cover [all Brady 
situations].”288 Based solely on these two cites, Justice Blackmun 
abandoned the Agurs framework. 
In citing Strickland to justify reinterpreting Agurs, Justice 
Blackmun effectively “borrowed” from disparate areas of 
constitutional law in order to justify subjecting all Brady claims to a 
strict harmless-error requirement.289 (Figure 2 thus represents this 
borrowing move by showing Strickland as a yellow circle distinct 
from the red or blue triangles in the main Brady lines.) This 
borrowing move ironically paired lax and formal approaches to stare 
decisis. On the one hand, Justice Blackmun’s borrowing facilitated a 
lax overruling of Agurs’s framework. On the other, this overruling 
was accomplished through a highly formal reading of constitutional 
precedent. 
The formal logic of Justice Blackmun’s borrowing move was 
this: given that the Court did not differentiate between the three 
situations when it cited Agurs outside the Brady context, therefore 
the Agurs differentiation no longer has a place inside the Brady 
context. This argument literally removes text from context and then 
rejects context as irrelevant.290 Thus, while Strickland did indeed 
characterize Agurs as mandating a single test for materiality of 
suppressed evidence, the context was Sixth Amendment ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claims.291 In this context of failure by defense 
 
 286. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 681 (discussing United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858 
(1982); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)). 
 287. 458 U.S. 858 (1982). 
 288. Id. at 682 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). 
 289. On borrowing generally, see Laurin, supra note 100; Nelson Tebbe & Robert L. Tsai, 
Constitutional Borrowing, 108 MICH. L. REV. 459, 463 (2010) (defining the interpretive practice 
of constitutional borrowing). For the proposition that the Bagley test represents an “internalized 
harmless error requirement,” see Brandon L. Garrett, Innocence, Harmless Error, and Federal 
Wrongful Conviction Law, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 35, 71 (2005). 
 290. Cf. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 712 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that Valenzuela-Bernal and 
Strickland fell outside Brady context). 
 291. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (discussing United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 104 
(1976)). 
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counsel—not suppression by the prosecution—the Strickland Court 
had no reason to discuss the finer points of Agurs’s framework.292 
Yet Justice Blackmun noted the formal description of Agurs and used 
that form to effectively overrule Agurs without any justification. 
Justice Blackmun’s stare decisis reasoning was entirely 
contestable at the time. Yet the Agurs dissenters (Justices Stevens 
and Marshall) failed to object loudly on stare decisis grounds. Before 
exploring the reasons and consequences of the dissenters’ rhetorical 
strategy, a final observation about Justice Blackmun’s opinion is in 
order. As authority for the proposition that Brady represented a 
“limited departure from the pure adversary system,” Justice 
Blackmun cited his own Moore opinion as well as Justice Harlan’s 
Giles dissent.293 The citation to Justice Harlan’s dissent reveals 
Justice Blackmun’s fundamental allegiance to the older procedural 
due process school that always objected to broad discovery 
obligations. Per Justice Blackmun, Brady did not “displace the 
adversary system as the primary means by which truth is uncovered, 
but [exists] to ensure that a miscarriage of justice does not occur.”294 
True to his school, Justice Blackmun suggested that Brady did not 
embrace a direct commitment to finding truth so much as provide a 
limited procedural mechanism to prevent systemic failure. 
Despite Bagley’s frontal attack on Agurs’s constitutional 
authority, Justice Stevens in his dissent did not make any overt 
appeals to stare decisis. This omission is explained by Justice 
Stevens’s surprising rereading of his old Agurs opinion. According to 
Justice Stevens, the “question in Agurs was whether the Brady rule 
should be extended to cover a case in which there had been neither 
perjury nor a specific request.”295 Justice Stevens then contended that 
Agurs had actually held that the Brady Rule did not apply in the no-
 
 292. Valenzuela-Bernal also concerned Sixth Amendment issues (confrontation). While this 
case at least implicated government culpability (it concerned deportation of witnesses potentially 
helpful to the defense), Chief Justice Rehnquist used Agurs as only one example of the many 
areas of constitutional law where some showing of materiality or prejudice is required. See 
Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 867–71. In this context, the Court still had no need to discuss the 
finer points of the Agurs framework. 
 293. See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 675 & nn.6–7 (citing, inter alia, Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 
795 (1972); Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 117 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). 
 294. Id. at 675. 
 295. Id. at 711 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
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request situation and so created a brand-new constitutional rule.296 
Justice Stevens finally faulted Bagley for applying the Agurs no-
request rule to a pure Brady Rule situation in which the government 
“failed to disclose favorable evidence . . . clearly responsive to the 
defendant’s specific request.”297 Note how this interpretation of 
Agurs concedes that the government’s textualist argument in Agurs 
had merit.298 Though unanswered in Agurs, Justice Stevens replied in 
Bagley to the old textualist objection by asserting that Agurs had 
deliberately expanded the frontiers of Brady jurisprudence. 
Justice Stevens’s revisionist interpretation of Agurs is 
disputable.299 Yet the hermeneutic merits of his interpretation matter 
less than its implications for our stare decisis case study. Bagley may 
have abandoned Agurs’s framework, but Justice Stevens now 
admitted that Agurs departed from the Brady Rule. Justice Stevens, 
therefore, could not mount a strong formal critique of Justice 
Blackmun’s fidelity to constitutional precedent. Neither could Justice 
Stevens persuasively argue that Justice Blackmun failed to adhere to 
Agurs’s underlying reasoning. On the one hand, Agurs had justified 
its voluntary-disclosure obligation based on Brady’s substantive 
commitment to truth. On the other, Agurs justified ratcheting up 
harmless-error inquires in Brady cases based on a procedural due 
process commitment to limiting discovery. The balance between 
these rationales was always precarious, and the result in Agurs 
suggested that Justice Stevens had actually tipped the scales in favor 
of the procedural school. The end result in Bagley—denying relief to 
the convict—thus followed Agurs. 
As he had done in Agurs, Justice Marshall also dissented in 
Bagley. However, Justice Marshall saw no stare decisis problem 
 
 296. Id. at 709 (“Our holding in Agurs was that the Brady rule applies in two of the situations, 
but not in the third [no request].”). 
 297. Id. at 712–13. 
 298. Compare supra note 260 (describing the government’s argument in Agurs), with Bagley, 
474 U.S. at 710 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“As written, the Brady rule states that the Due 
Process Clause is violated when favorable evidence is not turned over ‘upon request.’”). 
 299. In Agurs, Justice Stevens stated that “the rule of Brady . . . arguably applies in three quite 
different situations.” United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). The no-request situation 
was the third situation “in which the Brady rule arguably applies.” Id. at 107. Justice Stevens 
never explicitly rejected this “arguable application,” nor did he explicitly state that Agurs was an 
extension of Brady. Thus, the proposition that Agurs announced a brand-new rule rather than 
applied Brady is dubious. Justice Stevens may have subjective insight on authorial intent, but that 
counts for little in Supreme Court hermeneutics. 
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between Agurs and Bagley and indeed condemned the Court for 
“adhering to the view articulated in Agurs.”300 Even though the 
materiality framework changed, Justice Marshall saw Agurs and 
Bagley as equivalent in spirit. His justificatory attitude thus inhibited 
any formal or strict critique of Bagley’s overruling move. 
Furthermore, the only doctrinal authority apparently recognized in 
his Bagley dissent was that of his prior dissent in Agurs.301 Building 
on themes he introduced in Agurs, Justice Marshall advocated for the 
“return [of] the original theory and promise of Brady.”302 
The thrust of Justice Marshall’s substantive due process 
argument proceeded from the “fundamental premise” that “the 
purpose of a trial is as much the acquittal of an innocent person as it 
is the conviction of a guilty one.”303 To support this foundational 
doctrinal premise, Justice Marshall inevitably cited Justice Fortas’s 
concurrence in Giles.304 Justice Marshall then offered a panoply of 
prudential arguments as to why the new Bagley test “legitimiz[ed] 
the non-disclosure of clearly favorable evidence” and tempted 
prosecutors “to play the odds” and withhold favorable evidence on 
the “chance that [the] evidence will later turn out not to have been 
potentially dispositive” in the eyes of reviewing courts.305 He rested 
this judgment on an empirical observation:  
Almost a decade of lower court practice with Agurs 
convinces me that courts and prosecutors have come to pay 
“too much deference to the federal common law policy of 
discouraging discovery in criminal cases, and too little 
regard to due process of law for defendants.”306 
Justice Marshall’s reference to a “federal common law policy of 
discouraging discovery” suggests that Agurs had already persuaded 
members of the federal judiciary to join the ranks of the procedural 
Brady school. Justice Marshall wanted to buck this trend, and his 
 
 300. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 700 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 301. See id. at 704, 706 (citing Agurs, 427 U.S. at 119–20 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that normal constitutional-error test should apply to Brady violations)). Justice Marshall cited his 
Agurs dissent five separate times in Bagley. 
 302. Id. at 702. 
 303. Id. at 692 (quoting In re Kapatos, 208 F. Supp. 883, 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (internal 
citations omitted)). 
 304. Id. (citing Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 98 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring)). 
 305. Id. at 701. 
 306. Id. at 702 (quoting United States v. Oxman, 740 F. 2d 1298, 1310–11 (3d Cir. 1984)). 
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Bagley dissent set out a manifesto for his substantive view of the 
doctrine. 
Unfortunately for the strong Brady tradition, no Supreme Court 
jurist since Justice Marshall has defended the substantive school with 
similar passion or learning. The next subpart tells the story of how 
Bagley’s narrow materiality standard became entrenched in the 
doctrine through repeated citations in Brady cases—by both majority 
and dissenting opinions—from 1985 until the present. While 
reviewing that narrative, it is important to bear in mind how Justice 
Stevens’s betwixt-and-between Agurs opinion helped facilitate 
Justice Blackmun’s Bagley triumph. Justice Stevens did not commit 
to a substantive conception of Brady in Agurs and did not 
forthrightly present Agurs as an extension of Brady based on a 
justificatory approach to stare decisis. This opened up a rhetorical 
space in the doctrinal discourse for Blackmun to urge a strongly 
procedural Brady view backed by a formal borrowing move from a 
disparate area of constitutional doctrine. In sum, the lack of a clear 
and committed doctrinal or metadoctrinal basis for Agurs 
undermined its persuasive impact over the dialectic. 
B.  Fact Controversies: 
Bagley to Cain 1985–2012 
Despite Justices Marshall and Stevens’s objections, Bagley 
settled the materiality question. For better or for worse, Justice 
Blackmun’s reasonable-probability-of-a-different-outcome test stuck. 
Since 1985, the competing sides in Brady debates have accepted the 
Bagley test and fought instead over how the test applies on given sets 
of facts. Though Justices have still disagreed mightily on just 
outcomes for particular defendants, disagreements have mostly 
turned on questions of fact rather than law. This subpart briefly 
surveys these fact-intensive conflicts from Bagley until this Term’s 
hot-off-the-presses Smith v. Cain307 case. 
As this survey shows, the factual nature of most contemporary 
Brady disputes signals two interrelated shifts in the debate. First, 
acceptance of Bagley by both majority and dissenting opinions in this 
era reveals how deeply entrenched the Brady Rule has become in due 
 
 307. 132 S. Ct. 627 (2012). 
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Figure 3 completes the map of Brady’s territory. As previously, 
blue upward-facing triangles represent opinions that granted relief on 
Brady grounds (or, if written in dissent, that would have granted due 
process relief). These are the inheritors of the substantive Brady 
tradition. In chronological order, the opinions in this line are Kyles v. 
Whitley (Justice David Souter for the Court, 1995);308 Strickler v. 
Greene (Justice Souter concurring in part and dissenting in part, 
1999);309 Banks v. Dretke (Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg for the 
Court, 2004);310 Cone v. Bell (Justice Stevens for the Court, 2009)311 
and Smith v. Cain (Chief Justice Roberts for the Court, 2012).312 The 
red triangles facing down represent opinions that denied relief on 
Brady grounds (or, if written in dissent, that would have denied due 
process relief). These opinions carried on the weak, procedural 
Brady tradition. In chronological order, the opinions in this line are 
Bagley (Justice Blackmun for the Court, 1985); Kyles (Justice Scalia 
dissenting, 1995); Strickler (Justice Stevens for the Court, 1999); 
Banks (Justice Clarence dissenting, 2004); Cone (Chief Justice 
Roberts concurring; Justice Thomas dissenting, 2009); and Cain 
(Justice Thomas dissenting, 2012). 
 
 308. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995). Kyles was a 5–4 decision. Justice David Souter 
delivered the opinion of the Court. Id. at 421. Justice John Paul Stevens filed a concurring 
opinion in which Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer joined. Id. at 454 (Stevens, J., 
concurring). Justice Antonin Scalia dissented in an opinion joined by Chief Justice William 
Rehnquist and Justices Anthony Kennedy and Clarence Thomas. Id. at 456 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
 309. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 296 (1999) (Souter, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). Strickler was a 7–2 decision. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the 
Court. Id. at 265. Justice Thomas joined Parts I and IV of this opinion. Id. Justice Kennedy joined 
Part II of Justice Souter’s dissent. Id. 
 310. Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668 (2004). Banks was a 7–2 decision. Justice Ginsburg 
delivered the opinion of the Court. Id. at 674. Justice Thomas filed an opinion joined by Justice 
Scalia concurring in part and dissenting in part. Id. at 706 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). The part to which Justice Thomas dissented specifically concerned Brady. See 
id. 
 311. Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449 (2009). Cone was a 5–2–2 decision. Justice Stevens delivered 
the opinion of the Court. Id. at 450. Chief Justice Roberts filed an opinion concurring in 
judgment. Id. at 476 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in part 
and dissenting in part. Id. at 478 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice 
Thomas filed a dissenting opinion and was joined by Justice Scalia. Id. at 486 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). 
 312. Smith v. Cain, 132 S. Ct. 627 (2012). Cain was an 8–1 decision. Chief Justice Roberts 
delivered the opinion of the Court. Id. at 629. Justice Thomas dissented. Id. at 631 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). 
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Kyles is the first mainline Brady case decided after Bagley, and 
it exemplifies the fact-bound nature of debates in this modern period. 
A trial court sentenced Curtis Lee Kyles to death in 1984 for a 
robbery–murder in New Orleans.313 The Brady issue concerned 
undisclosed evidence that cast doubt on the credibility of a key 
informant.314 Writing for a five-Justice majority, Justice Souter held 
that Kyles deserved a new trial.315 Though this relief counts as a 
victory for the strong Brady school, Justice Souter’s opinion marks a 
shift in the substantive tradition. In his opinion, Justice Souter 
identified three “prominent case[s] on the way to current Brady 
law”—Brady itself, Agurs, and Bagley.316 He referred only to the 
majority opinions in those cases and did not cite to the Marshall or 
Stevens dissents. Nor did Justice Souter invoke Justice Fortas’s 
concurrence in Giles. In short, Justice Souter did not champion the 
old substantive school. Rather, by embracing Bagley, he articulated a 
new-school vision of Brady that legitimized a more procedural 
perspective. 
In dissent, Justice Scalia did not object to Justice Souter’s legal 
analysis.317 Instead, he objected to the propriety of the Court’s 
factual review and to its particular conclusions.318 Justice Scalia’s 
 
 313. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 422–23. 
 314. See id. at 424–28 (describing the investigation). The informant’s nickname was 
“Beanie.” His real name was Joseph Wallace, though he gave police other names. See id. at 424. 
At trial, Kyles argued that Beanie had actually killed the victim and was now framing him for the 
murder. Id. at 429. During collateral review, counsel discovered the police had not disclosed 
multiple items of evidence that casted doubt on Beanie’s credibility and motives. See id. at 431. 
The Court listed seven categories of allegedly undisclosed evidence. Id. at 428–29. 
 315. Id. at 421–22. 
 316. Id. at 432–34. 
 317. This might initially seem surprising since Kyles did involve one important legal 
question—whether Brady’s scope extended to “evidence known only to police investigators and 
not to the prosecutor.” Id. at 438. During litigation below, the State had taken the formal position 
that Brady did not apply to the police. However, at oral argument, counsel for the State apparently 
conceded that the police did have a duty to disclose. Id. at 438 n.11. Justice Souter thus did not 
contradict the State’s ultimate position when he extended Brady to require disclosure of 
exculpatory evidence possessed by the police. Though Justice Scalia dissented, he took no issue 
with this legal point. Even though no previous Brady-line case had recognized a police duty to 
disclose, Justice Scalia apparently agreed that existing precedent justified recognition of this duty. 
This shows that even Justice Scalia’s formalism has limits—the analogy between police and 
prosecutors seemed fundamentally sound. 
 318. However, Justices Souter and Scalia battled over the law governing habeas review of 
capital cases. Compare id. at 422 & n.1, with id. at 456–57 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (illustrating 
disagreement over the scope of deference to be given to the lower court’s evidentiary review 
decisions in capital cases). 
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opening line perfectly captures his procedural approach to due 
process: 
In a sensible system of criminal justice, wrongful 
conviction is avoided by establishing, at the trial level, lines 
of procedural legality that leave ample margins of safety 
(for example, the requirement that guilt be proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt)—not by providing recurrent and 
repetitive appellate review of whether the facts in the record 
show those lines to have been narrowly crossed.319 
From this premise, Justice Scalia decried the Kyles majority’s 
very consideration of “a fact-bound claim of error rejected by every 
court, state and federal, that previously heard it.”320 Court review 
was inappropriate in “an intensely fact-specific case in which the 
court below unquestionably applied the correct rule of law.”321 
Moreover, Justice Scalia continued, “the Court . . . get[s] the facts 
wrong.”322 The remainder of Justice Scalia’s dissent countered 
Justice Souter’s lengthy analysis of evidence supporting Kyles’s 
innocence with his own lengthy analysis indicating Kyles’s guilt.323 
The primacy of facts in the debate between Justices Souter and 
Scalia in Kyles stands in stark contrast to the primacy of law in 
Bagley’s contest between Justices Blackmun, Marshall, and Stevens. 
Factual primacy signals a settling of the legal doctrine. Figure 3 
illustrates this settling process, as both Justice Souter’s and Justice 
Scalia’s opinions point back to Justice Blackmun’s Bagley opinion. 
This congruence shows how they agree on prior tradition. It also 
shows the strength of the procedural view over the modern doctrine. 
The doctrinal settling process continued in Strickler v. Greene. 
This case concerned Tommy Strickler’s capital conviction for 
kidnapping and murder.324 The suppressed Brady material at issue 
impeached the testimony of a prosecution witness.325 Writing for a 
 
 319. Id. at 456 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 320. Id. 
 321. Id. at 460. 
 322. Id. 
 323. Compare id. at 441–54 (majority opinion), with id. at 464–75 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 324. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 266 (1999). 
 325. Id. The witness testified to seeing the abduction. At trial, she described it as a horrifying 
event implicating Strickler as a ringleader. The undisclosed materials made the event seem far 
less dramatic. 
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seven-Justice majority, Justice Stevens anchored his legal analysis in 
Kyles but, based on the facts, held that the suppressed evidence was 
not “material” under Brady.326 Justice Stevens thus denied relief to 
Strickler—a weak Brady outcome—but affirmed the authority of 
Justice Souter’s new-school Brady opinion in Kyles. As it happens, 
Justice Souter dissented in Strickler—yet he explicitly noted that “I 
look at this case much as the Court does” and agreed with the 
majority’s characterization of the Brady Rule.327 Indeed, Justice 
Souter recognized that he applied “the same standard to the same 
record” and cited back to his Kyles opinion for that standard.328 For 
the second case in a row, majority and dissent agreed on the law. 
This agreement heralds an important synthesis in the Brady 
dialectic. After years of competing theses and antitheses about the 
Brady Rule’s materiality requirement, the Bagley-Kyles-Strickler 
interpretation of the Brady Rule became entrenched in constitutional 
discourse. Since these cases all interpret the Brady Rule’s statement 
of due process (as opposed to directly interpreting the Due Process 
Clause), the entrenchment of Bagley-Kyles-Strickler represents a 
second-order entrenchment of the Brady Rule itself. I suggest that 
such second-order entrenchment signals that Brady has become 
“super-precedent.” When antagonistic doctrinal schools agree not 
only on the rule stated by a constitutional precedent but also on 
second-order rules for implementing the precedent, overruling has 
become unthinkable. In the decades after 1963, disputes over the 
proper application of the Brady Rule increasingly assumed the prior 
legitimacy of the Rule. With Bagley-Kyles-Strickler, the prior 
legitimacy of the Rule settled a layer deeper into the very tissue of 
constitutional discourse. 
 
 326. See id. at 280–82 (citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995)). Justice Stevens 
specifically noted that his opinion “[did] not modify Brady” and rejected any suggestion that he 
announced a “new rule.” Id. at 289 n.35. While no justice on the Court disagreed with Justice 
Stevens, it should be noted that the Fourth Circuit had apparently misunderstood the Brady Rule. 
See id. at 290 (noting that the “standard used by that court was incorrect”). In other words, though 
the Court saw the doctrine as settled, lower courts were not yet all on the same page. 
 327. Id. at 296 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Souter 
supplemented the majority’s legal analysis with a fascinating scholarly exposition of the 
“circuitous path by which the Court came to adopt ‘reasonable probability’ of a different result as 
the rule of Brady materiality.” See id. at 300. 
 328. Id. at 302. 
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Yet the Brady dialectic did not end just because Brady became 
super-precedent. Rather, the locus of controversy shifted from the 
formulation of legal rules to the application of legal rules. Debates 
came to turn on facts rather than law. The factual-dispute pattern 
seen in Kyles and Strickler continued in our final three mainline 
cases—Banks, Cone, and Cain. In all three cases, the majority and 
dissent agreed on the proper legal test for materiality. In all three 
cases, the convict won some Brady relief with Justice Thomas 
dissenting on interpretation of the facts in the record.329 While these 
outcomes might seem to indicate that the substantive Brady school 
now controls the Court, the reality is not so simple. The fact-bound 
majority opinions did not advance a strong substantive conception of 
Brady doctrine but rather advanced a more procedural understanding 
of the Rule that is consistent with Bagley. 
In 2004’s Banks v. Dretke, Justice Ginsburg gestured at the older 
substantive school perspective. The case involved suppressed 
impeachment evidence, and once again majority and dissent agreed 
on the materiality test.330 Writing for a seven-Justice majority, 
Justice Ginsburg found the suppression undermined confidence in 
the verdict, and she stressed the prosecutorial obligation to seek truth 
and “refrain from [using] improper methods to secure a 
conviction.”331 In dissent, Justice Thomas responded, “Although I 
find it to be a very close question, I cannot conclude that 
nondisclosure of [the prosecution witnesses’] informant status was 
prejudicial under Kyles.”332 Sparks did not fly in Banks—the two 
sides just interpreted the record differently. 
 
 329. Justice Scalia joined Justice Thomas’s dissents in Banks and Cone, but not in Cain. 
Although dotted arrows mostly connect Justice Thomas’s opinions to each other, I suggest they 
are linked as part of the same tradition. See infra note 348. 
 330. Compare Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 698–99 (2003), with id. at 706 (Thomas, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 331. Id. at 696 (majority opinion) (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). See id. at 702–03. Justice Ginsburg’s emphasis on truth-
seeking came in response to the State’s rather misguided argument that, under Brady, “the 
prosecution can lie and conceal and the prisoner still has the burden to . . . discover the evidence.” 
Id. at 696 (quoting Transcript of Oral Arg. at 35, Banks, 540 U.S. 668 (No. 02-8286)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 332. Id. at 706 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). With the question of 
prosecutorial intensions indirectly raised by Justice Ginsburg’s opinion, Justice Thomas stressed 
in his dissent that prosecutors had not “knowingly failed to turn over evidence . . . in violation of 
Brady.” Id. at 709–10 (emphasis in original). 
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2009’s Cone v. Bell featured a more revealing exchange between 
the competing schools in their post-Bagley form. Gary Cone’s Brady 
claim involved suppressed evidence of his serious drug addiction that 
could have mitigated juror assessment of his culpability for a double 
murder.333 In the five-Justice majority opinion, Justice Stevens 
closely reviewed the trial record and concluded that Cone had a 
viable Brady claim under the Bagley-Kyles-Strickler-Banks 
materiality standard.334 In dissent, Justice Thomas basically agreed 
with the materiality test but disagreed wholeheartedly on inferences 
of the record.335 While this follows the essential factual-dispute 
pattern, Cone did break new ground in a long-simmering debate over 
the constitutional relevance of prosecutorial ethics. In a footnote to 
his opinion, Justice Stevens stated: “Although the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as interpreted by Brady, only 
mandates the disclosure of material evidence, the obligation to 
disclose evidence favorable to the defense may arise more broadly 
under a prosecutor’s ethical or statutory obligations.”336 
For this proposition, Justice Stevens cited to Kyles and ABA 
rules and standards.337 He then continued, observing that “the 
prudent prosecutor will err on the side of transparency, resolving 
doubtful questions in favor of disclosure.”338 For this latter 
proposition, Justice Stevens invoked his long-since-forgotten Bagley 
dissent. 
 
 333. Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 451 (2009). 
 334. See id. at 469–70 (citing Banks, 540 U.S. 668, 698–99; Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 
263, 290 (1999); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995)); see also id. at 475 (concluding 
after record review that the suppressed evidence “may well have been material to the jury’s 
assessment of the proper punishment”). 
 335. Justice Thomas actually accused the majority of misstating the Kyles standard. See id. at 
490–91 (Thomas, J., dissenting). However, the quibble with Justice Stevens’s phrasing is 
unpersuasive—especially in light of Chief Justice Roberts’s concurrence. See id. at 477 (Roberts, 
C.J., concurring). Cf. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 298–300 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part) (analyzing potential sources of confusion in phrasing of materiality standard). Once again, 
the real dispute in Cone concerned the record. See Cone, 556 U.S. at 498–500 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (concluding that “record as a whole” does not indicate that Brady material would have 
changed sentence). 
 336. Cone, 556 U.S. at 470 n.15. 
 337. Id. (citing Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437; STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION 
FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION § 3–3.11(a) (1993); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R 
3.8(d) (2008)). 
 338. Id. (citing United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 667, 711 n.4 (1985) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting)). 
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The significance of Justice Stevens’s footnote was not lost on 
Chief Justice Roberts. The Chief Justice concurred in judgment but 
did not join Justice Stevens’s opinion.339 In the main, Chief Justice 
Roberts saw “no reason to quarrel with the Court’s ruling on the 
Brady claim” since it ordered the court below to conduct “a fact-
specific determination . . . under the established legal standard.”340 
However, Chief Justice Roberts wrote separately to make 
clear that the lower courts should analyze the issue under 
the constitutional standards we have set forth, not under 
whatever standards the American Bar Association may have 
established. The ABA standards are wholly irrelevant to the 
disposition of this case, and the majority’s passing citation 
of them should not be taken to suggest otherwise.341 
Here, Chief Justice Roberts adeptly fired a preemptive shot 
against any sub silentio expansion of Brady. Chief Justice Roberts 
objected to any bootstrapping of ethical obligations into Brady’s 
constitutional jurisprudence. In answer to Justice Stevens’s citation 
to his Bagley dissent, Chief Justice Roberts gamely cited to Justice 
Scalia’s dissent in Kyles.342 Though he voted with the new “strong” 
school majority, Chief Justice Roberts made clear in his concurrence 
that he will carry on the traditions of the competing procedural due 
process school. 
Indeed, the Court’s 2011 Term decision in Smith v. Cain proves 
this point. The case involved Juan Smith’s conviction for killing five 
people during an armed robbery.343 Police suppressed pretrial 
statements by the crime’s only eyewitness that would have cast doubt 
on his identification of Smith at trial.344 Writing for an eight-Justice 
majority, Chief Justice Roberts held that the undisclosed evidence 
undermined confidence in Smith’s conviction.345 Although Chief 
Justice Roberts cited to the rules of Cone, Kyles, and Brady, he failed 
to quote any of the language from these opinions concerning 
 
 339. See id. at 477 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
 340. Id. 
 341. Id. at 477–78. 
 342. See id. at 477 (citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
 343. Smith v. Cain, 132 S. Ct. 627, 629 (2012). 
 344. The witness had repeatedly told police he could not identify who had done the killing. At 
trial, he was equally vehement in his identification of Smith. See id. at 630. 
 345. Id. 
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innocence, truth, or seeking justice.346 On the other hand, he did 
invoke language from Agurs limiting the application of the Brady 
Rule in eyewitness impeachment cases when “the State’s other 
evidence is strong enough.”347 In sum, Chief Justice Roberts’s terse 
opinion offered a formal account of Brady untethered to any 
substantive concern for justice and emphasized limits on this rule. 
Though technically a Brady victory, his opinion advances a 
procedural perspective. 
In contrast to Chief Justice Roberts’s bloodless opinion, Justice 
Thomas issued a long and passionate dissent. Citing to Justice 
Scalia’s dissent in Kyles, Justice Thomas wrote, “When, as in this 
case, the Court departs from its usual practice of declining to review 
alleged misapplications of settled law to particular facts . . . the Court 
should at least consider all of the facts.”348 As in Banks and Cone, 
Justice Thomas agreed on the materiality test but concluded that the 
majority got its facts all wrong. Justice Thomas’s citation to Justice 
Scalia’s Kyles dissent is revealing in that Chief Justice Roberts also 
cited to that opinion in his Cone concurrence.349 Justice Scalia’s 
Kyles dissent now stands as a classic articulation of the proceduralist 
view of Brady. 
While the inheritors of the substantive and procedural Brady 
traditions now agree on the materiality test, the reasonable-
probability-of-a-different outcome inquiry inherently turns on fact-
bound questions. The competing assessments of the facts in Kyles, 
Strickler, Banks, Cone, and Cain may be attributable to ideological 
differences among Supreme Court Justices. As Professor Dan Kahan 
has shown in his path-breaking work, modern psychological research 
suggests that judicial fact-finding is deeply susceptible to the 
 
 346. Id. (citing Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 469–70 (2009); Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434; and Brady 
v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963)). 
 347. Id. (citing United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112–13 n.21 (1976)). 
 348. Id. at 640 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (citing Kyles, 514 U.S. at 456 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas’s citation here ultimately justifies my decision in Figure 3 
to link his dissents in Cain, Cone, and Banks to each other and back to Justice Scalia’s Kyles 
dissent. Not only do Justice Thomas’s opinions share the same author, they are thematically 
identical in their focus on facts and reading of them as upholding state prosecution. 
 349. Cone, 556 U.S. at 477 (Roberts, J., concurring in judgment) (citing Kyles, 514 U.S. at 
458). 
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phenomena of motivated reasoning and cultural cognition.350 A 
Justice’s ideological worldview can easily affect how she sees the 
record before her. Although most—but not all—Justices agreed on 
the results in Strickler, Banks, and Cain, the readings of the facts 
were very hotly contested along ideological lines in Kyles and Cone. 
I suggest this will be the dominant pattern for Brady cases going 
forward—unless the debate shifts back to one about the scope of law 
rather than application of facts. 
With the procedural school’s ascendancy after Bagley, the Brady 
Rule has generally been strictly interpreted, and its scope has not 
been seriously expanded. The more time has passed, the more 
Brady’s due process boundaries have seemed fixed. Thus, in Connick 
v. Thompson, Justice Scalia was able to claim with some authority 
that the right to untested evidence existed at the frontier of Brady 
jurisprudence. His formal reading of the Brady Rule’s “favorability” 
requirement resonates with the procedural approach to Brady that has 
been dominant since Bagley. Of course, the foregoing analysis has 
also shown that Justice Scalia’s view of Brady’s borders—and the 
formal approach to stare decisis on which it depends—is not the only 
way of reading the history of due process jurisprudence. In the 
following Part, I present a normative argument against Justice 
Scalia’s formal approach. 
V.  THE MAJESTIC CONCEPTION OF BRADY 
Eighteen years after Justice Marshall’s retirement in 1991, the 
Supreme Court decided District Attorney’s Office v. Osborne.351 The 
case concerned William Osborne’s quest to access forensic DNA 
evidence that he maintained would prove his innocence of rape.352 
Prosecutors possessed semen and hair evidence but refused to allow 
Osborne to test it.353 Osborne sued under federal civil rights law and 
prevailed in lower courts on the theory that Brady authorized 
 
 350. See generally Dan M. Kahan, Foreword: Neutral Principles and Motivated Reasoning, 
125 HARV. L. REV. 1 (2011); Dan M. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, 60 STAN. L. REV. 
115 (2007) (questioning theories of constitutional neutrality in light of cognitive studies that 
reveal individuals are predisposed to mold their perceptions of policy-relevant facts to their own 
group commitments). 
 351. Dist. Attorney’s Office v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2312 (2009). Like John Thompson, 
Osborne litigated under the Federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
 352. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2314. 
 353. Id. 
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postconviction access to evidence.354 Before the Court, prosecutors 
conceded that DNA testing could prove Osborne’s innocence but 
disputed that Osborne had a constitutional right to access 
evidence.355 
Writing for a five-Justice majority, Chief Justice Roberts agreed 
with the prosecutors and denied Osborne relief.356 Chief Justice 
Roberts’s Brady analysis was decidedly brief. In his view, Brady was 
a “trial right,” plain and simple.357 Given that Osborne had been 
convicted, he was no longer cloaked in the presumption of innocence 
and no longer had the same due process liberty interests.358 Since 
“nothing in our precedents” suggested that Brady applied 
postconviction, Chief Justice Roberts concluded that “Brady [was] 
the wrong framework.”359 Q.E.D.360 
Like Justice Scalia’s claim about untested evidence in 
Thompson, Chief Justice Roberts’s procedural due process 
perspective of Brady precedents was entirely contestable and 
dependent upon a formal approach to stare decisis. Yet as in 
Thompson, no justice sitting in 2009 offered a full-throated defense 
of the old substantive school backed by a justificatory approach to 
stare decisis.361 In my view, the failure is regrettable.362 
This Part presents a doctrinal Brady argument in favor of 
recognizing a right to access to untested forensic evidence—whether 
 
 354. Dist. Attorney’s Office v. Osborne, 521 F. 3d 1118, 1128 (2008) (citing Thomas v. 
Goldsmith, 979 F.2d 746, 749–50 (9th Cir. 1992) (authorizing postconviction DNA testing under 
Brady in a habeas case)). 
 355. See Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2336–38 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting the State’s 
concession that testing would provide conclusive confirmation of Osborne’s guilt or revelation of 
his innocence). 
 356. See id. at 2320–22 (majority opinion) (denying existence of freestanding substantive 
right to postconviction DNA testing). 
 357. Id. at 2319–20. 
 358. Id. at 2320. 
 359. Id. at 2319–20. 
 360. Entirely confident in this proof, Chief Justice Roberts said nothing more about Brady. 
 361. In his dissent, Justice Stevens did suggest that “the concerns with fundamental fairness 
that motivated our decision in [Brady] are equally present when convicted persons such as 
Osborne seek access to dispositive DNA evidence.” Id. at 2335 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
However, Justice Stevens also conceded that “Brady does not directly provide for a 
postconviction right to such evidence.” Id. While lamentable, this concession is not surprising 
given Justice Stevens’s opinions in Agurs and Strickler. See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 
(1999); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976). 
 362. In the interests of full disclosure, I was part of the Innocence Project team representing 
Osborne in his DNA-access litigation. 
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in the pretrial context at issue in Thompson or in the postconviction 
setting from Osborne. This argument is rooted in the old substantive 
due process tradition of Brady and a justificatory attitude toward 
stare decisis. Here, I take particular inspiration from the insightful 
dissents by Justice Marshall that set out a majestic conception of 
Brady. Ultimately, I argue that even though the procedural school 
now dominates the doctrine, remembering Justice Marshall’s 
majestic conception and reintroducing it into the constitutional 
conversation can positively influence the future dialectic. 
The argument here begins with concession. A formal 
interpretation of the Brady Rule does not support a right to untested 
evidence. Untested evidence is not “favorable” under the Rule since 
testing could ultimately inculpate defendants and confirm guilt. 
Moreover, since the Rule only prohibits suppression of evidence 
favorable “to an accused,” it also does not formally apply after trial 
when defendants have become “convicted” rather than “accused.” It 
is thus granted that recognizing a Brady right to untested evidence 
would formally expand due process precedent. Finally, I concede 
that the formal stare decisis interpretation is coherent and leads to a 
result consistent with a procedural understanding of Brady as a 
limited procedural means to ensure a fair trial. 
While conceding the coherence of the formal and procedural 
take, I respond that an equally coherent justificatory and substantive 
understanding of Brady precedent is possible—and normatively 
preferable at this dynamic moment in history. As this Article’s 
survey has shown, the substantive school has long recognized that 
due process also stands for a constitutional commitment to seek truth 
and protect innocence. Sometimes recognition of these deep 
commitments requires looking beyond current forms of procedure 
directly to the ends of justice. When the time is right, a justificatory 
stare decisis approach is necessary. 
Thus, Justice Holmes showed a willingness to expand due 
process precedent beyond “notice and opportunity to be heard” forms 
in order to confront mob intimidation in the Frank and Moore cases. 
The Mooney Court expanded the mob-domination principle to 
prohibit prosecutorial subornation of perjury. In Brady itself, Justice 
Douglas expanded the due process principle prohibiting bad-faith 
prosecutorial actions to also cover good-faith nondisclosure of 
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favorable evidence. Since Brady, Agurs expanded the Rule’s scope 
to require disclosure in absence of a specific defense request, and 
Kyles extended the prohibition on prosecutorial suppression to 
police. None of these expansions perfectly fit with formal readings of 
prior precedent. All required a justificatory attitude toward stare 
decisis. 
Only empty allegiance to form prevents recognition of the right 
to untested evidence under Brady. Prosecutors in Osborne admitted 
that postconviction DNA testing could potentially prove William 
Osborne’s innocence but denied him access to testing anyway. This 
reeks of bad faith, and Chief Justice Roberts’s refusal to recognize a 
Brady right in this context comes off as arid formalism. Similarly, 
Justice Scalia’s invocation of Youngblood in his Thompson 
concurrence blithely ignores that the Court denied relief to a man 
later proved innocent by DNA testing.363 If ever a case’s subsequent 
history called for questioning whether procedural means adequately 
protected substantive ends, Youngblood is it. Youngblood 
demonstrates the need for due process expansion rather than the 
wisdom of formally limiting it. 
Now, procedural due process proponents could respond to this 
by granting the wisdom of finding a pretrial right to access untested 
evidence but standing firm against applying Brady postconviction.364 
After all, pretrial DNA access potentially implicates procedural 
concerns for trial fairness whereas postconviction access does not. 
Though it does require a bigger expansion to recognize Brady’s 
postconviction applicability, I suggest doctrinal authority exists for 
this move. Specifically, the authority is Justice Marshall. 
As already seen in his Agurs and Bagley dissents, Justice 
Marshall embraced a strong substantive conception of Brady as a 
bulwark protection of innocence. Though neither of those opinions 
confronted the postconviction question, Justice Marshall did analyze 
 
 363. One of Youngblood’s doctrinal ironies is that it saw Justice Blackmun—normally a 
stalwart of the procedural Brady school—dissent. In that prescient dissent, Justice Blackmun 
recognized that there was “a distinct possibility . . . that a proper test would have exonerated” 
Youngblood. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 68 (1988) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice 
Blackmun was right and Justice Scalia should have recognized this. 
 364. Of course, recognizing this would contradict Justice Scalia’s Thompson argument. Yet I 
suspect that many ardent procedural due process adherents would accept this. The formalism of 
Justice Scalia’s opinion is extreme. 
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the issue in a pair of overlooked dissents.365 Both opinions concerned 
Ronald Monroe, who maintained his innocence of capital murder. 
Six months after his conviction, police discovered information 
implicating another man in the murder yet never disclosed this 
exculpatory evidence to Monroe.366 Luckily, Monroe’s own 
investigators later uncovered the evidence and Monroe won an 
execution stay.367 Despite finding Monroe’s “due process rights 
under Brady had been violated,” the federal habeas court remanded 
Monroe’s case to state court to determine the suppressed evidence’s 
materiality.368 Monroe unsuccessfully sought Supreme Court review 
of this order.369 Dissenting from the denial of certiorari, Justice 
Marshall urged review to clarify “the scope of a defendant’s rights 
under Brady . . . during the period following his conviction.”370 
In his dissent, Justice Marshall made the case for Brady’s 
postconviction applicability. He began by explaining the backing for 
Brady’s warrant: “The message of Brady and its progeny is that a 
trial is not a mere ‘sporting event’; it is a quest for truth.”371 This 
quest for truth “may not terminate with a defendant’s conviction.”372 
Justice Marshall then pointed to newly discovered evidence statutes, 
which demonstrate that “the sovereign has decided that justice will 
be best served by qualifying the finality of a conviction.”373 
Permitting the State to avoid newly-discovered-evidence proceedings 
by “suppressing the very evidence that would enable a defendant to 
trigger such proceedings” defeated justice.374 In the end, Justice 
Marshall argued that the court below had “trivialize[d] the 
constitutional right recognized in Brady and its progeny[,]” and 
castigated the Court for standing by “in the face of the dilution of the 
due process rights of an individual who may not even be guilty.”375 
 
 365. See Monroe v. Butler, 485 U.S. 1024, 1026–28 (1988) (Marshall, J., dissenting in the 
denial of certiorari) (“Monroe II”); Monroe v. Blackburn, 476 U.S. 1145, 1145 (1986) (Marshall, 
J., dissenting in denial of certiorari) (“Monroe I”). 
 366. Monroe I, 476 U.S. at 1146. 
 367. Id. at 1146–47 
 368. Id. at 1147–48 (discussing the district court’s ruling). 
 369. Id. at 1151. 
 370. Id. at 1145. 
 371. Id. at 1148. 
 372. Id. 
 373. Id. The statutes were Louisiana state statutes. 
 374. Id. at 1149. 
 375. Id. at 1150–51. 
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Justice Marshall’s analysis perfectly encapsulates the 
justificatory logic of the substantive Brady school. Ronald Monroe’s 
personal story may have faded from memory, but Justice Marshall’s 
teachings should not be forgotten.376 It matters little that Justice 
Marshall wrote in dissent. Dissents by Justice Holmes in Frank and 
Justice Harlan in Giles inspired the substantive and procedural 
schools respectively and eventually influenced the course of the due 
process doctrine. Justice Scalia’s Kyles dissent currently guides the 
procedural school. What matters more is that Justice Marshall’s 
majestic conception—stressing the primacy of truth and substantive 
justice—once again be heard in the constitutional conversation. 
As this Article has shown, Brady doctrine has evolved through a 
dialectic between substantive and procedural due process 
perspectives. Though the procedural view now dominates, the 
doctrine is not forever lost. It was once inconceivable that criminal 
defendants would have any right to discovery—it is now deep 
constitutional intuition and super-precedent. In this current era of 
high-profile DNA exonerations, constitutional intuitions could again 
change. Prosecutorial withholding of potentially exculpatory 
untested evidence could become a relic of an unenlightened past. If 
this is to happen, however, the substantive argument needs to be 
pressed and responded to. The formal command of stare decisis 
needs to be challenged as unfaithful to the spirit of Brady’s due 
process context. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
In this Article, I have mapped the unfolding dialectic of Brady 
doctrine. The dialectic has pitted two lines of opinions against each 
other. The line embracing procedural understanding of due process 
has adopted a formal attitude toward stare decisis. The competing 
line, committed to a more substantive view of due process, has relied 
upon a justificatory understanding of precedent. The maps have 
illustrated the rise and decline of the substantive school and 
 
 376. On remand, the Louisiana state courts denied Monroe relief on the very ground that 
Brady did not apply postconviction. See Monroe II, 485 U.S. 1024, 1026–27 (1988) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting in the denial of certiorari). The Court again failed to grant certiorari and Justice 
Marshall dissented. See id. However, lingering concerns over Monroe’s innocence inspired a 
gubernatorial commutation of his death sentence. See Peter Applebome, Governor of Louisiana to 
Spare Inmate’s Life, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1989, at A16. 
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explained how the procedural view came to dominate current 
doctrine. Doctrinal movement has occurred through arguments about 
stare decisis. While expansion of due process precedent was a past 
norm, the doctrine settled after Bagley and formal boundaries 
appeared more fixed. Brady debates since Bagley have largely turned 
into disputes over facts rather than law. Yet some debates over scope 
remain. In the last Part, I considered the question of a Brady right to 
untested evidence. Invoking the majestic substantive tradition, I 
argued for doctrinal expansion to recognize the right in order to keep 
up with evolving norms of justice. 
While the Brady dialectic illuminates the tension between 
procedural means and substantive ends in criminal prosecutions, the 
metadoctrinal implications of this case study extend beyond due 
process. I suggest that competing formal and justificatory 
conceptions of stare decisis can affect the expansion of constitutional 
doctrine more generally. Just as due process today looks a far cry 
from what it did in 1868, so too have other areas of constitutional 
doctrine changed radically since the Republic’s founding and 
subsequent civil war. While overrulings undoubtedly account for 
many of the changes, doctrinal expansion has also played a vital role 
in transforming the constitutional landscape. For example, both 
Eighth Amendment377and First Amendment378 jurisprudence have 
recently experienced significant doctrinal expansion that necessarily 
strained formal readings of prior precedent. Scholarly attention to the 
competing formal or justificatory attitudes toward prior precedent 
might help illuminate the dialectics by which these and other hotly 
contested doctrines assumed their current boundaries. 
In the end, I hope to have demonstrated the methodological 
utility of mapping contested Supreme Court doctrine. By carefully 
 
 377. In last Term’s Miller v. Alabama decision, a 5–4 majority extended the Eighth 
Amendment to prohibit mandatory life without parole sentences for juveniles convicted of 
murder. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012). This ruling was in turn built upon 
prior extensions of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. See id. at 2463 (citing Graham v. Florida, 
130 S. Ct. 2011, 2021 (2010) (striking down juvenile life without parole for nonhomicide 
offenses); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005) (striking down juvenile death penalty)). 
 378. In the 2010 Term’s Citizens United decision, the majority controversially extended a line 
of opinions granting corporations First Amendment rights. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election 
Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 899–900 (2010) (noting recognition of corporate First Amendment 
rights and extension to political speech in First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 475 U.S. 765 
(1978)). 
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tracing back competing lines of citation advocated in majority, 
dissenting, and concurring opinions, it becomes possible to identify 
the most prominent teachers and texts of competing doctrinal 
schools. These schools represent continuous jurisprudential 
traditions. Though the vocabularies and assumptions of these 
conflicting traditions change over time, charting their genealogies 
demonstrates a deeper continuity connecting today’s doctrinal 
dialectics to great debates of the past. For scholars and teachers, this 
method can enrich our picture of how argument shapes doctrine. For 
advocates and participants in the debate, this kind of close study 
reveals what it really means to stay true to your school. 
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